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PLACING PROPER LIMITS ON
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME IN AREAS
BEYOND SELF-DEFENSE:
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ADMISSION IN
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES
Tobin P. Richer*

INTRODUCTION
Child Abuse and Battered Women: throughout the past several decades,
these two devastating social problems have risen to the forefront of social,
legal, and political debate. State statutes, endless volumes of both federal
and state case law, and a literary saturation of law reviews, psychiatric
trade journals, and other publications have all attempted to decipher and
rationalize just where and when the defense of Battered Woman
Syndrome (BWS) should apply. However, even with such an extensive
line of case precedent and a virtual library of text, courts have remained
in confusion and have struggled with the task of drawing succinct
boundaries to BWS application. Although BWS has been well established
and widely accepted in the self-defense setting, the epicenter of debate
now surrounds the issue of where, when, and under what circumstances
beyond self-defense, should evidence of this powerful defense be
appropriately applied.
In the recent case of State v. Mott, the Supreme Court of Arizona was
faced with the pressing issue of whether to expand the traditional
admission lines and allow BWS expert testimony to negate the "specific
intent" element in a prosecution of child abuse and neglect.! Charged
with first-degree murder and child abuse leading to death or serious injury,
Mott attempted to introduce BWS expert testimony to show she lacked the
"Tobin P. Richer Executive Articles Editor of the DEPAUL JOuRNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW; J.D.
(candidate), DePaul University College of Law, 1997; B.A. University of Wisconsin-Madison,
1995. t State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536; 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997).
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capacity to "knowingly or intentionally" kill or abuse her child.2 This
novel, yet dangerous; concept of BWS testimony was rejected by the
Arizona Supreme Court, and therefore, the appellate court decision
admitting the evidence was overturned.3 Due to the Arizona Supreme
Court's careful analysis, an unfit parent was prevented from escaping
justice and the strength of the appropriate BWS defense was protected
from widespread, debilitating abuse. By preventing unreasonable
expansion of BWS, the Arizona court effectively preserved the available,
justified, and often necessary BWS defense in the self-defense setting.
After a brief overview of both the applicable federal and Arizona
state court precedents, this article will analyze the decision of State v. Mott
in accordance with traditional notions of expert testimony evidence and
will discuss the reach of BWS into determinations of specific intent.
When the analysis is complete and the drastic effects of expanding BWS
into the child abuse and neglect area are illustrated, it will become clear
why the refusal to allow BWS evidence to prove lack of intent in State v.
Mott serves as a guide to limiting BWS testimony and prevent abusive
parents from escaping justice. Quite simply, BWS should not apply
beyond the self-defense setting.
BACKGROUND
Federal Cases
Well before the defense of BWS was introduced into the American
judicial system, the federal courts addressed the issue of whether mental
deficiencies, not amounting to insanity, could be introduced as evidence
to negate elements such as intent and premeditation.4 Although not a
murder case involving child abuse, in Fisher v. U.S., the United States
Supreme Court ruled the constitutional notion of Due Process was not

2Id. at 538; 1048.
Fisher v. U.S., 328 U.S. 463 (1946). Insanity itself had long been recognized as a defense
to criminal action as decided under the widely accepted M'Naughten Rule. The M'Naughten test

for insanity states, in essence, that a defendant will be relieved of her crimina liability if, at the
time of the offense committed, the defendant, due to such a disease or defect in cognitive mental

processes or perception making it impossible for the defendant to recognize the nature and quality
of her acts, was unable to realize that what she was doing was wrong. Fisherconcerned mental

disabilities short of insanity, not amounting to the M'Naughten insanity requirements.
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violated when the trial court refused to allow the jury to weigh mental
deficiency evidence in their determination of the defendant's capacity for
premeditation and deliberation.5 Because Fisher's alleged mental
impairments did not qualify or rise to the level of "insanity" under the
M'Naughten test, the Court stated Fisher was rightfully prohibited from
introducing the evidence and was not, therefore, entitled to a jury
instruction requiring the jury to include an evaluation of the mental
deficiencies in their determination.
The defendant Fisher, assaulted Ms. Reardon, a fellow library
employee, after Reardon complained to the library superiors of Fisher's
"slacking." 7 Fisher began slapping Reardon impulsively, then chased her
throughout the library, striking her with a log of wood and strangling her
to "stop her from hollering." s After Reardon stopped breathing and
became limp, Fisher dragged her to a lavatory, cleaned up the blood spots
throughout the building, and eventually killed Reardon by stabbing her in
the throat.9 Although Fisher stated in a written confession his main reason
for killing Reardon was because she reported him for not cleaning the
library floor sufficiently, Fisher claimed his low levels of emotional and
mental stability precluded his ability to form the requisite premeditation
and deliberation required for a first degree murder conviction.' Fisher
sought to introduce the testimony of several psychiatrists to verify his
mental defects and also insisted on a jury instruction allowing an
evaluation of the alleged defects when determining intent, premeditation,
and deliberation." The psychiatric evidence was introduced, however the
instruction was refused; after conviction for first degree murder, Fisher
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.' 2

5

1d. at 472. Fisher was charged with first degree murder and thus, it vas the state's

obligation to prove premeditation and deliberation. Fisher wanted to present the expart testimony
to rebut the state's evidence pertaining to such.
61d. at 473
7id. at 465, 479. Fisher also accused Reardon of referring to him as a "black nigger."

"Id.at 465, 4S0.
'Fisher v. U.S., 328 U.S. 463, 465 (1946).
'0Md. at 466.
1Id.
"Id. at 467. Instructions were given on insanity, irresistible impulse, and traditional nations
of premeditation and deliberation.
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The Court began by stipulating the psychiatric evidence may indeed
have assisted the jury in concluding Fisher was mentally "somewhat
below the average" with "minor stigmata of mental subnonnalcy."' 3 Yet,
as the Court continued, evidence of "mental weakness character traits,"
short of insanity, need not be admitted in criminal trials even for the
purpose of negating intent, premeditation, or deliberation." Deferring to
the District of Columbia Rules of Evidence, the Court noted that, although
there are obviously possible classifications of mentality beyond merely
sane or insane, States are free to decide whether to accept a "diminished
responsibility" theory based on mental defect and whether such a theory
should be applied to elements of intent. 5 Although the Court refrained
from expressing an opinion as to whether evidence short of insanity
should be allowed, the Court clearly stated they would not "force" any
state to adopt a requirement that criminal defendants be allowed to present
evidence of mental deficiencies to determine or negate specific elements
of the crime.' 6 Such a requirement, the Court ruled, would involve a
fundamental change in the common law theory of responsibility and
should, therefore, be left to the better-qualified state legislature for

debate. 17
This theory of "diminished capacity" or "diminished responsibility"
was next addressed in the landmark decision of U.S. v. Pohlot.8 In
Pohlot, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled The
Insanity Defense Reform Act clearly revealed Congressional intent to
prohibit mental disease or defect evidence not amounting to insanity when
attempting to create a "diminished capacity" or "diminished

13Id.
4

" Fisher v. U.S., 328 U.S. 463, 472 (1946).
51d. at 475. The "diminished responsibility" differs from insanity in the following way:

insanity, if proven, has an end result of proclaiming the defendant "not guilty" by reason of
insanity. However, when mental defect is introduced to negate intent, the end result, once intent
is negated, is a lessening of the charge (i.e. murder to manslaughter or the like). Thus, a lesser
charge leads to "diminished responsibility" because the defendant is "less responsible" due to a
lack of intent. Diminished capacity and diminished responsibility are used interchangeably
throughout the article, as both essentially assert the same theory of mens rea.

'61d.at 476.
"Id. at 477.

"U.S. v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (1987).
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responsibility" defense. 9 Although Congress banned diminished capacity
defenses in general, the court noted that psychiatric evidence of mental
abnormalities might, in some cases, be relevant to ajury's determination
of specific intent or other mens rea elements of a crime. 0 Yet, the court
also called for meticulous scrutiny in these rare situations in order to
protect from evidentiary abuse, and to prevent the jury from confusion and
2
consideration of such evidence on a "diminished capacity defense" level*
As the court stated, psychiatric evidence not amounting to insanity may
be admitted to negate specific intent, but only when the evidence
contributed to a "legally acceptable theory of mens rea." '
Stephen Pohlot admittedly planned, orchestrated, and finalized a plan
to have his wife, Elizabeth, murdered. 23 In his own defense, however,
Pohlot offered testimony that his wife had dominated him and severely
abused him throughout their "strange" relationship. 4 Pohlot claimed his
wife had broken his thumb by striking it with a coffee pot, gouged his face
with her nails, shot him in the stomach, threatened him with a hunting
knife, and repeatedly locked him out of their bedroom. 2 In addition to the
abuse, Pohlot also alleged his wife was solely responsible for the
psychiatric illness and severe anorexia of their daughters."' In 1985,
Elizabeth filed for divorce, froze Pohlot's assets, and obtained a court

"9Id. at S89. See Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 17(a). The Act 1"as pa=d in

the wake of John Hinkley's acquittal of charges arising from his attempted shooting of President
Ronald Reagan. The Act eliminated the "volitional prong" of the well-accepted MPC approach
to insanity which would acquit the accused due to insanity if he lacked "substantial capacity" to

conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Further, the Act eliminated all other affirmative
defenses based on mental disease or defect short of insanity, transferred the burden of proof of
insanity to the defendant, and limited the use of expert psychological testimony on ultimate legal
issues. See also U.S. v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1061 (11 th Cir. 1990).

2
OPohlot, 827 F.2d at 889. The court drew a distinction between a "diminishcd capacity"
defense and a simple admission of psychiatric testimony to negate intent. As the court stated,
admitting psychiatric evidence short of insanity to negate intent is merely a rule of c.idence; it is
not an affrmative defense of "diminished capacity" in and of itself and therefore, such an "intent"

based admission is not precluded by the Insanity Defense Reform Act.
21

1d.

22Id. at 906.
23Id. at 890.
724U.S. v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 890 (1987).
s1d. at 890.
26

Id.
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order barring Pohlot from the family home.27 In response to these events,
Pohlot initiated the scheme for Elizabeth's murder by discussing the idea
with a friend and by contacting Michael Selkow whom Pohlot and his
friend suspected as having ties to organized crime.2" Selkow, in reality a
government informer, had several conversations with Poblot discussing
Elizabeth's daily routine and how Selkow would most likely "bring a
killer in from Italy. ' 2 9 After Pohlot agreed to the offer and presented
Selkow with an advance of $8,000 for the killing, Pohlot was arrested and
tried on five counts of using interstate commerce in the commission of
murder for hire and one count of conspiring to commit mvxder.30
At trial, Pohlot relied primarily on the affirmative defense of insanity,
claiming he misperceived the entire "plot to kill" experience as a "fantasy"
representing an unrealistic attempt to overcome an inability to cope with
his wife's continuous abuse.31 Pohlot claimed he was incapable of
responding to his wife's many instances of abuse and that he had even
sought legal assistance, although to no avail, after the stomach shooting
incident.3 z Psychiatrist Dr. Gary Glass diagnosed Pohlot as a "passive
aggressive" and as having a "compulsive, passive dependent
personality., 33 Further, Dr. Glass testified that in his expert opinion,
Pohlot sincerely perceived that Pohlot and Elizabeth would have gotten
"back together and be[en] happy" even if the contract to kill had actually
consummated.34 At the trial's conclusion, Pohlot requested a jury
instruction that the evidence of his abnormal mental conditions be
considered when deciding whether the state had met its burden of proving
specific intent as required for murder.35 The trial court declined to instruct
the jury as such, stating the proposed "insanity evidence" and instruction
27

1d.

28

1d"
U.S. v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 892 (1987).

29
3

"Id. In order to convict Pohlot, the prosecution had to prove Pohlot willfully participated
in the conspiracy with the intent to advance an object of the conspiracy, and to voluntarily,

intentionally, and with specific intent do something the law forbids. Id. at 894.
3

"Id.
at 893.
2

31d.
33Id.
34

U.S. v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 893 (1987).

31d. at 894.
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were merely a disguised attempt to assert a "diminished capacity" defense
short of insanity which Congress explicitly abolished by passing the
Insanity Defense Reform Act.36
On appeal, the Third Circuit disagreed with the prosecution's
assertion that evidence of mental abnormality is never admissible even to
negate elements of inens rea.37 The appellate court stated congressional
intent was only to abolish all "affirmative defenses" that "excuse" conduct
resulting from a mental defect not amounting to insanity." Psychiatric
evidence that tends to negate specific intent, however, was
distinguishable; because it did not constitute a "defense" as such, but
merely negated one element of the crime itself.39 As the court reasoned,
psychiatric testimony concerning a lack ofintent is not a defense at all, but
simply a standard rule of evidence since it did not excuse or justify the
crime committed nor provide grounds for acquittal." The appellate court
stated Pohlot's proffered evidence might have merely shown why Pohlot
could not be held fully accountable for the specific intent crime of
41
murder.
However, despite this encompassing discussion into the
differentiation between diminished capacity versus mens rea defenses, the
Pohlot court remained dubious of Pohlot's true motive behind the
evidence and rejected the admission, indicating a suspicious fear of broad
application. 42 The court warned that permitting across-the-board use of

36

Id. [emphasis added].

3'7Id.

at 896.
sd. The Court noted although showing'mental disease or defect prevented the defendant

from having the 'state of mind' required for the crime charged" is often termed "diminished
capacity defense," it does not provide grounds for acquittal and therefore is not a defense, on its
own, id. at 897.
"'J.S. v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 896 (1987).
4
.d
4

id. In most cases, the psychiatric evidence is used to negate premeditation or deliberation
which, under traditional notions of murder, would reduce first degree murder to second degree
murder. Further, if the evidence showed a lack of intent, it may, in some cases, reduce second
degree murder to manslaughter. The evidence in no case will ever excuse the crime or make the
accused any less morally culpable. It may only show she lacked one of the specific legal elements
required for conviction, which in turn would only subject her to a lesser charge, hence lessened
or "diminished"
responsibility.
42

1d at 903.
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psychiatric evidence to negate criminal intent may open the jury to
theories ofjustification and "diminished responsibility" disguised in the
illusory casing of a "lack of mens rea" defense. 43 There[ore, evidence
such as Pohlot's should only be admitted when it supports a "legally
acceptable theory of mens rea."'
As the court pointed out, even if
Pohlot's psychiatric testimony had been admitted, it still would have
fallen short of a legally acceptable theory of lack of intent.4 ' Pohlot acted
with "considerable awareness" of what he was doing, carefully planning
and scheming over a lengthy period of time to assure the murder of his
wife would never be traced back to him.46 Thus, the proffered psychiatric
testimony addressed not whether Pohlot had the "intent" necessary to
commit murder, but rather, whether Pohlot had a meaningful
"understanding" of the consequences of his actions. 47 As the court
reasoned, this evidence did not tend to negate intent, but rather, attempted
to excuse or justify the murder scheme based on sympathy for 45
Pohlot's
wife.
his
by
caused
abnormalities
suffered abuse and the mental
Admittedly, Pohlot may not have contemplated or appreciated the
consequences of the proposed murder at the time, however, the court
firmly stated, "purposeful activity is all the law requires. 49 Pohlot
purposely engaged in activity that would have lead to the death of his
wife; and, therefore, psychiatric testimony of his mental abnormalities
would only have presented a variation of the abolished. "diminished
capacity" or "diminished responsibility" defense."0 As the court reasoned,
"we often act intending to accomplish the immediate goal of our acts
while not fully appreciating the full consequences ..." however, when a
spouse intentionally kills the other, "the spouse is guilty of homicide

43Id "
44U.S.
v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 903 (1987).
45

ld. at 906.

41Id. at 906, 907.
47

Id.

48Id

"U.S. v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 907 (1987).
sold.
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nonetheless.""1 In closing, the court reiterated its strong position that
psychiatric evidence be heavily scrutinized so that defendants, such as
Pohlot, may not disguise a "diminished capacity" defense under the veil
of "lack of mens rea" evidence, and thereby confuse the jury into
the crime rather than determining the requisite specific
'justifying"
52
intent.
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit was pressed with clarifying the Pohlot distinction between
psychiatric testimony tending to negate specific intent versus psychiatric
testimony aimed at presenting an affirmative defense of "diminished
capacity." 3 As the court observed in U.S. v. Cameron, most often when
a defendant claims to have psychiatric evidence that she was "incapable"
of forming the requisite intent for a certain crime, she is merely claiming
she had an incapacity to reflect on or control the behaviors which resulted
in the crime accused. 4 Such evidence, the court noted, does not support
a legally acceptable theory of mens rea and is simply another example of
an attempted "diminished capacity" defense strictly outlawed by the
Insanity Defense Reform Act.55 Therefore, as in Pohlot, although
psychiatric evidence regarding mental abnormality was not entirely barred
or justifying the crime to any degree
per se, evidence aimed at excusing
56
acceptable.
not
simply
was
Although Cameron was indicted upon charges of conspiring to
distribute five grams of "crack cocaine," many of the Pohlotintent-based
rationales were repeatedly cited. 7 Cameron sought to introduce
"diminished capacity" psychiatric evidence of schizophrenia, not as an
affirmative defense, but as an attack on the prosecution's necessary burden

S'ld. As the court stated, the purpose of Pohlot's activity was to hire someone to kill his
vife, regardless of whether he actually wanted his wife to die. That purposeful activity was
enough 2to satisfy intent, id. at S90.
1 Id.
'U.S. v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051 (1Ith Cir. 1990).
'4 Id. at 1066. See also Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diramshcd
Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomcd Marriage,77 COLUM-. L Rv. 327, 834

(1997).
S"Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1051.
56d"
71d. at 1064-67.
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of showing specific intent to distribute cocaine.5 8 The court immediately
cited Pohlot,however, stating that at no point in Cameron's pleadings or
arguments did Cameron explain how psychiatric evidence of this nature
would support a "legally acceptable theory" that she did not intend to
distribute cocaine.59 Cameron was simply unable to show a connection
between her alleged schizophrenia and the alleged inability to form
intent."
The Cameron court cited UnitedStates v. Staggs as illustrating when
psychiatric evidence to negate specific intent would indeed contribute to
a "legally acceptable theory of mens rea."' In Staggs, the defendant was
62
charged with threatening to shoot a police officer, a specific intent crime.
However, Staggs introduced psychiatric evidence theorizing that, because
he suffered from a severe mental condition, it is highly unlikely that he
would make such a threat. 63 The Staggs court noted, and the Cameron
court concurred, that such an offering did not imply a "legal excuse" for
the conduct, nor did it suggest an unacceptable theory of "unconscious
motivation" or lack of "volitional control."' 64 Instead, the court ruled
Staggs was essentially trying to prove he acted in conformity with his
reflexive, and thereby often unintentional, personality trait.65 Whereas
Cameron claimed she lacked the ability to form orpossess.the requisite

"8U.S. v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1056 ( 1 h Cir. 1990). Conspiracy to distribute crack
cocaine was a specific intent crime and therefore, like in Pohlot, the prosecuticn bore the burden
of proving such specific intent. Just as in Pohlot, Cameron claimed her psychiatric evidence was
aimed at rebutting the Prosecution's evidence, not at proffering her own independent affirmative

defense of "diminished capacity." But schizophrenia did not amount to insanity and therefore,
stand alone as the "defense" to the crime.
could not
59

1d at 1067. The Court stated the district court had not abused its discretion in "prohibiting

the unarticulated, general psychiatric evidence of mental abnormality to negate specific intent,"
id. at 1054.
'Old.

"Id. (citing United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1997)). The distinction is
between actual state of mind at the time of the offense and the ability to form such a state of mind
at the time of the offense. Since Staggs concerned the actual state of mind at the time of the
offense, the psychiatric evidence was admitted.
62
31d. at 1067.

6U.S. v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1067 (1 th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Staggs,

553 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1997)).
"Id.
6

sId.
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intent, Staggs claimed his mental condition made it unlikely he actually
didpossess the requisite state of mind at the time of the offense.5
Although Cameron agreed with Pohlot that Congress did not intend
to prohibit all usage of psychiatric testimony short of insanity, Cameron
reaffirmed the standard that mental deficiency evidence should be limited
to assisting the jury in determining elements of the crime and should in no
instance stand on its own and extend to issues of legal excuse or
justification. 67 Whether or not Cameron had "volitional control" of her
actions or was capable of reflecting on the nature and consequences of
those actions was deemed wholly irrelevant. The Cameron court
concluded the requested evidence would only insinuate a "lessened moral
had expressly excluded in the Insanity
culpability" which Congress
6s
Act.
Reform
Defense
The Cameron court also relied upon U.S. v. Mite, a case where a
defendant charged with conspiracy to possess cocaine and possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute, attempted to present "mental state"
psychiatric testimony that she lacked the capacity to form intent due to
complete psychological domination by her mother.69 Because of the
alleged domination, White claimed she was psychologically "compelled"
to distribute cocaine on her mother's behalf.70 However, just as in
Cameron and Pohlot,the court in White recognized that a "good motive"
for violating the law is irrelevant if the defendant was "cognizant" that the
law was being violated by her proscribed actions. 7
Cameron knew she was violating the law when she conspired to
distribute cocaine; and, thus, just as in White, there was sufficient specific
intent "regardless of underlying motivation" or ability to reflect on long-

6

5s1d.
Id Cameron did assert an insanity defense as well, but the court stated that a mere shovwing
that Cameron had been diagnosed with schizophrenia "did not nece-sarily mean she was legally
insane." The schizophrenia evidence did not assist the insanity defense and thus, was ecluded
by the court, id. at 1059, 1060.
6SU.S. v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1067 (11th Cir. 1990).
691d. (citing U.S. v. White, 766 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1985)).
70
Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1063.
WId. at 1067. "Good motive" is not necessarily "good" in the positive connotation; it
merely means a motive other than a criminal one.
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term consequences. 72 The acts, independent of conscious or unconscious
influence, were nonetheless intentional; and, therefore, evidence regarding
the influence of mental disease or abnormality on Cameron's behavior
would not have assisted a jury in determining an acceptable mens rea
defense. 73 Because Cameron only presented evidence that psychiatrists
diagnosed her as schizophrenic and failed to tie that mental defect
evidence to a likelihood that she did not have the intent to distribute
cocaine, the evidence was precluded as an invalid attempt to present a
"dangerously confusing theory," more akin to justification than a "legally
acceptable theory of lack of mens rea."74
Although the federal courts provided a foundational basis for
determining when psychiatric testimony short of insanity should and
should not be applied, the Fisherdecision admitted that state courts were
free to decide whether or not to accept "diminished capacity" defenses,
75
thereby, permitting a broader admission of psychiatric evidence.
Theoretically, if a state chose to include an affimnative defense of
"diminished capacity" in their criminal code, this was the state's
prerogative and the evidence under discussion would be admitted. In
Arizona, however, the legislature followed federal precedent and refused
to adopt "diminished capacity" defenses and evidence regarding such in
any capacity. The following discussion traces this road to exclusion in
Arizona.
Arizona Background
In 1965, the Arizona judiciary first addressed the relationship between
mental deficiencies and criminal tendencies in the case of State v.
Schantz.76 In Schantz, the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the theory
of "diminished capacity," recognizing the state legislature was solely
responsible for promulgating criminal law and "it [the legislature] had not

' 21d. at 1063-64.
"U.S. v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1067 (11th Cir. 1990).
741d. at 1067-68.

75See Fisher v. U.S., 328 U.S. 463 (1946) (demonstrating where the Court made no opinion
as to whether such evidence should or should not be excluded, but merely slated it would not
"force" the District of Columbia to adopt such an admission requirement).
' 6State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200; 403 P.2d 521 (1965).
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recognized a disease or defect of mind in which volition does not exist ...
as a defense to prosecution for [a crime]." 77 The court recognized the state
legislature, when drafting Arizona criminal law, had refused to accept the
Model Penal Code (MPC) approach which relieved criminal responsibility
due to insanity as well as mental disease or defect in the "volitional
process" of the human mind.78 Instead, the Arizona Legislature adopted
the M'Naughten approach, relieving criminal responsibility only w%,hen
there were defects in perception or cognitive mental processes that
amounted to insanity. 7

Schantz was charged with murder after neighbors witnessed Schantz
stab his wife in the back and neck with a butcher's knife and beat her in
the head and body with a ten-inch cast iron skillet.co A psychiatrist
examining Schantz, the psychiatric witness stated that, at the time of the
offense, Schantz did not know the nature and significance of his actions
and did not know right from wrong.8" Further, the psychiatrist stated
Schantz suffered from total amnesia, "where the emotional state
predominates without conscious awareness of the individual" and
therefore, Schantz's actions were outside of deliberate, volitional,
conscious awareness. 82 Schantz plead not guilty and requested a jury
instruction that his mental deficiencies be evaluated when determining the
requisite malice aforethought for first degree murder because Schantz
allegedly lacked the "capacity to design and contrive" the murder. 3 The

7Id. at 212.
7

sId. at 207-209. The MPC approach as disputed is MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 401-402(l) and

Commentaries which allow the introduction of evidence "whenever it [is] relevant to prove the
defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is an element of the defense" and recognizes
mental defects short of insanity which may not eliminate responsibility but rather, leszcn the
charge. See also Fisher v. U.S., 328 U.S. 463 (1946) (discussing the M'Naughten Approach, as
discussed supra in note 4).
9

' Schantz, 98 Ariz. at 207-209.

'OId. at 204.
"State v. Schantz, 9S Ariz. 200, 204; 403 P.2d 521,524 (1965).
'Id. It is important to note that Schantz did not plead insanity. It is conceivable that if
Schantz had offered a defense of insanity, the evidence may have been admitted to illustrate such.

But here, Schantz plead not guilty and sought to introduce the testimony to negate intent.
s3Id. at 205.
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court refused to grant the instruction; however, and thus, after his
conviction, Schantz appealed. 4
The Arizona Supreme Court held the proposed instruction requested
by Schantz presented a theory of "partial responsibility" or "diminished
responsibility" noting, that regardless of the proscribed label, the asserted
defense amounted to mental derangement distinguishable from "cognitive5
insanity" as understood and excepted in Arizona under M'NaughtenY
Although Schantz may not have been able to conform his acts to law or
evaluate the consequences of his actions, the mental defect factors were
irrelevant to determining legal malice aforethought, or the specific intent
to kill. 6 The court ruled that since Schantz's actions themselves were
intentional regardless of their intended outcome, psychiatric evidence
could not be admitted to show lack of capacity for specific intent; because
Schantz did not qualify for, nor even plead, M'Naughten insanity. 7
Further, the court stated malice aforethought, may be implied by the
behavior itself even where actual intent to kill does not necessarily exist.
Deferring again to the legislative record, the court ruled that "malice"
shall be implied where there is unlawful killing with no considerable
provocation, regardless of mental disease or defect, unless such defect
amounted to insanity 88 The court concluded that "volition," or the ability
to determine or to choose a course of action, may also be implied by the
nature of the criminal behaviors or actions themselves.8 9
The Arizona court reiterated the standard excluding psychiatric
evidence negating specific intent in the 1980 case of State v. Laffoon.90
Laffoon posed the question of whether, when determining criminal
responsibility, a jury may consider voluntary intoxication.., not as a

'Id.

'56Id. at 210-211.
' State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 210-211; 403 P.2d 521, 529 (1965).
7
" Id. at 210. The court gave two hypothetical examples to illustrate their point: where a
defendant chokes another resulting in death, or when a defendant shoots another in the knee which
eventually results in death. In both cases, although the defendants may not have intended death
as an end result, the nature of their actions themselves implied malice and sati;fied the requisite
intent.
"Id.
at 212.
89Id.

9"State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484; 610 P.2d 1045 (1980).
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defense, but as the intoxication relates to the ability of the individual to
form specific intent.91 Although the Arizona Supreme Court allowed the
jury to consider the intoxication testimony, the court stated that even with
such an admission, wholly voluntary acts of the defendant would never
excuse subsequent criminal conduct. 92
Defendant Laffoon was fired from his job and became severely
intoxicated after spending the remainder of his workday in various bars. 93
Late in the afternoon, Laffoon went in search of his wife at the home of
his sister-in-law and upon discovering his wife, Laffoon instigated a fight.
Laffoon became violent and abusive, kicking both his wife and her sister
several times.94 Laffoon's wife fled the home and hid outside, returning
only when Laffoon threatened to kill her niece and "held the baby above
his head and, with both hands, slammed the five-week-old infant to the
ground." 95 Laffoon was indicted on first-degree murder and offered a
defense based on a "lack of capacity" to form specific intent due to
alcohol and heroin intoxication.96 The trial judge refused to admit the
expert testimony; and Laffoon appealed, claiming the evidence was
essential to show Laffoon lacked the ability to form specific intent. 7
The Supreme Court of Arizona reiterated that the M'Naughten test
for insanity was the sole standard for criminal responsibility in Arizona.?3
The court cited Schantz in again rejecting the theory of "diminished
responsibility" and disallowing the admission of mental disease or defect
evidence short of insanity for the purpose of negating criminal intent."9
After deciding that Laffoon's testimony alleging an incapacity for intent
was essentially an attempt at a diminished capacity or diminished
responsibility defense, the court cited several other Arizona state court

91

Id. at 486.

92

Id.This qualification was added to the instruction to assure the jury would not excuse the

crime based on voluntary intoxication.
9"Id. at 484.
94Id.

OState v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 4S4; 610 P.2d 1045 (1980). The baby's injuries included six
broken ribs, a scull fracture, subarachnoid hemorrhaging, and a bruised kidney.
9"Id. at 485.
97Id. at 486.
93Id.
99Id.
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decisions that have declined to allow psychiatric
testimony to negate
0
specific intent in intoxication circumstances.
Although the Arizona legislature did allow the effects of voluntary
intoxication to be used in an evaluation of a criminal defendant's culpable
mental state, the Laffoon court qualified this standard stating that wholly
voluntary acts of a defendant will not, under any circumstances, excuse
that defendant's subsequent criminal conduct.' This distinction between
"culpable mental state" and voluntary conduct was clarified in State v.
Ramos where the Supreme Court of Arizona stated public policy dictated
that one who voluntarily seeks the influence of alcohol should not be
insulated from criminal responsibility. 2 The Ramos court noted that the
great majority of moderately to grossly drunken persons are probability
"aware" of what they are doing and "aware" of the likely consequences of
their behavior.103 Further, although intoxication may release or relax
inhibitions, reasoning, and judgment, the Ramos court stated most
intoxicated defendants still have a sufficient capacity to form the
conscious mental processes required by the "ordinary definitions of most
specific mens rea crimes. ' '
In State v. Christensen, the Supreme Court of Arizona Court drew a
fine-line distinction between psychiatric evidence concerning "character
traits" and evidence regarding a "diminished mental capacity."' 05 As the
court contrasted, evidence of a defendant's "impulsive behavioral
tendency" was admissible when utilized to show the defendant acted in
conformity with that tendency, but inadmissible to show a lack of capacity
to premeditate or deliberate the offense. 06 The Court ruled Christensen
"c°Statev. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484,486; 610 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Ariz. 19110); sce also State
v. Steelman, 120 Ariz. 301; 585 P.2d 804 (Ariz. 1975); see also State v. Briggs, 112 Ariz. 379;

542 P.2d 804 (Ariz. 1975); see also State v. Intogna, 101 Ariz. 275; 419 P.2d 59 (Ariz. 1966); see
also State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200; 403 P.2d 521 (Ariz. 1966).
'01Laffoon, 125 Ariz. at 486.
'0 2State v. Ramos, 133 Ariz. 4, 6; 648 P.2d 119, 121 (Ariz. 1982).
'03Id. at 7.
1'Id. (citing State v. Stasio, 78 N.J. 467, 478; 396 A.2d 1129, 1134 (1979)).
05
" State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 33; 628 P.2d 580, 582 (Ariz. 198 1).
'°Id.This is similar to the argument mentioned in Staggs. The defendant is not claiming
an incapacity to form intent, he is simply asserting that because of his behavioral tendencies, it is
unlikely that he actually did not commit the crime as a result of reason or planning. The Arizona
Rules of Evidence do allow psychiatric testimony on character traits, but only to show that the
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was not attempting to show an inability to premeditate, but actually
offering admissible evidence of a "behavioral trait" relating to
Christensen's alleged characteristic impulsivity or lack of
premeditation.0 7 Therefore, because the evidence tended to show
Christensen did not have the requisite intent, rather than tending to show
he lacked the capacity toform intent, the Court ruled the expert testimony
was indeed admissible. 103
Christensen admitted to killing his former wife, but when charged
with murder, called a psychiatric witness to show Christensen had
difficulty dealing with stressful situations and that characteristically, his
actions were more "reflexive" than "reflective."'"G Although, recognizing
one of the essential questions the jury was forced to answer when
determining first degree murder was whether Christensen premeditated the
offense, the trial court refused to allow the psychiatric testimony claiming
it was an attempt to present a "diminishedt0 capacity" defense disallowed
by the decisions in Schantz and Laffoon."
The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed, stating that, because the
establishment of a "character trait" of acting impulsively tends to establish
that the defendant acted impulsively, the jury could have concluded
Christensen lacked the requisite premeditation at the time of the offense."'
The court distinguished personality traits from mental defects in that here,
the psychiatric testimony would have shown a behavioral personality that
often lacked premeditation as opposed to a mental defect that prevented
the abilityto premeditate."' As the court reasoned, the exclusion of such
evidence prevented Christensen from disputing elements of the charges
defendant acted in conformity therewith. See ARI7Z. EID. § 404(a)(1).
'( 7Christensen, 129 Ariz. at 35.
1031d.
"lr°d. at 33.
'Statev. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 34; 628 P.2d 580, 582 (Ariz. 1981). Sce also State

v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484; 610 P.2d 1045 (Ariz. 1980) (demonstrating where voluntary
intoxication evidence was not allowed to show an incapacity to form the requisite intent.); State
v. Schantz, 9S Ariz. 200; 403 P.2d 521 (Ariz. 1965) (ruling psychiatric evidence was not allowed
to negate the specific intent for murder when defendant was acting without deliberate volitional
control).
... Christensen, 129 Ariz. at 35.
"'id.at 35-36. The difference here, again, is lacking nzcns rca (acceptable) and lacking the
ability to form mens rea (unacceptable).
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against him and therefore, was inconsistent with fundamental notions of
justice."'
In State v. Gonzales, the Supreme Court of Arizona departed from the
long line of precedent cases excluding psychiatric mental abnormality
testimony in specific intent determinations ruling that when a defendant's
mental condition has probative value to material issues in dispute,
psychiatric testimony concerning those defects may not be excluded
without denying Due Process.' 14 As the court stated, when mental
diseases or defects such as retardation and organic brain syndrome are
relevant to intent or any other fact in issue, expert testimony may be
necessary to explain the potential effect of those impairments on the
disputed facts." 5
In Gonzales, the defendant was charged with sexual assault and
kidnaping, sought to introduce psychiatric testimony that his low
intelligence and probable organic brain damage affected his ability to
reason and therefore, diminished or even abolished his ability to form the
specific intent to commit rape." 6 The defense asserted the theory that
Gonzales was "merely present" at the crime and that his impaired ability
to reason and impaired ability to exercise judgment prevented him from
stopping the commission of the assault he was charged with participating
in.1 7 Therefore, because specific intent was an "essential element" to the
defense in demonstrating the defendant was "confused and unable to
realize the failure to act or help the victim was a criminal restraint on her
movement," the defendant claimed the psychiatric testimony could not be
11id.
"'State v. Gonzales, 140 Ariz. 349; 681 P.2d 1368 (Ariz. 1984).
1151d. at 353. See also Herman v. Vigil, 11 Ariz. App. 282; 464 P.2d 353 (Ariz. Ct. App,
1970) (holding where an offer of proof that a defendant's mental condition hps probative value
to a material issue in dispute, psychiatric testimony must be admitted to avoid a violation of due
process.).
" 6 Gonzales, 140 Ariz. at 351-352.
11d. at 352-353. The defense also claimed the evidence would be relevant for the jury in
evaluating the credibility of Gonzales himself. Because of his alleged brain abnormalities,

Gonzales may have become confused on cross examination and may answer questions in an
inconsistent way. Explaining away the tendency to commit such was one of the reasons the
defense sought to introduce the psychiatric testimony. However, the trial court refused to allow
such testimony stating it would interject sympathy into the jury and that the jury was perfectly
capable of determining whether or not the defendant was telling the truth.
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excluded without violating fundamental notions of justice" 8 After the
trial court's refusal to allow the testimony, and the defendant was found
guilty of unlawful imprisonment, a lesser included offense of kidnapping.
The appellate court affirmed and Gonzales appealed to the Supreme Court
of Arizona. 19
The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed the decision, claiming the
psychiatric testimony was relevant to the charged offense and essential to
Gonzales' asserted "mere presence defense."'20 As the court stated, the
trial court's exclusion precluded the defendant from introducing evidence
essential to his case and therefore, Gonzales' constitutional right to due
process was violated. 2 1 In order to prove unlawful imprisonment, the
state had to show the defendant was aware or under the belief that a
circumstance existed which "restrict[ed] another's movements without
consent, without legal authority, and in a manner which interferes
substantially with such a person's liberty .... ,22 In other words, it had to
be shown that the defendant by the nature of his actions, "knowingly
participated in" an activity or "knowingly failed to act" in a situation
constituting a restriction on the victim's movements.2
As the defense argued, and the Supreme Court of Arizona agreed, the
proffered psychiatric testimony may have shown that Gonzales' action, or
his "failure to act by not calling the police," was not a restraint because
Gonzales was confused and unable to understand that such a failure to act
was, in essence, a restraint on the victim. 12 4 Thus, Gonzales' mental
deficiency evidence was pivotal in the jury's determination and evaluation
of the "mere presence" defense and, therefore, its probative value was
ruled too great to be outweighed by the possible confusing and
sympathetic influences it might inadvertently impose on the jury.' s As

Id. at 353.
""State v. Gonzales, 140 Ariz. 349, 353; 681 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Ariz. 1984).
"Id.The Arizona supreme court also stated the evidence had probative value in providing
the jury with information essential to a fair, well-informed assessment of the defendant's
credibility.
12
11d

'2id.at 352 n.5
'3Id. at 349.

(citing A.RS. §§ 13-1304(A), 13-1406(A)).

"State v. Gonzales, 140 Ariz. 349; 681 P.2d 1368 (Ariz. 1984).
125Id.
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the court reasoned, Gonzales alleged he did not know or appreciate his
failure to act was a restraint and therefore, the psychiatric evidence was
probative in showing26 this liability-releasing misperception by way of
mental abnormality.
THE ARIZONA CASE OF STATE V. MOTT'

27

Facts
On January 1, 1991, Shelly Kay Mott left her two young children with her
boyfriend, Vincent Near, and returned approximately one hour later to
find Near fanning Mott's two-and-one-half-year-old daughter, Sheena,
with a towel.128 When Mott questioned Near about the incident, Near
stated that Sheena had "fallen off the toilet and hit her head."' 29 Later that
day, a friend, and former paramedic, visited the home and noticed the
child's eyes were fluttering, hands were twitching, and that Sheena was
having trouble sleeping.1 30 Due to these symptoms, the friend advised
Mott to take Sheena to the hospital immediately.13 1 Yet Mott and Near
offers from the friend to take
refused, declining several subsequent
32
himself.1
hospital
the
to
Sheena
The next day, Mott arrived at the home of Erin Scott "crying,"
because Mott was unable to wake up Sheena1 33 When Scott asked why
Mott had not taken her child to the hospital, Mott responded she was
worried the authorities would take Sheena from her due to Sheena's
bruises. 34 Mort then returned home, picked up Sheena, and returned to
Scott's home where Scott dialed 911 after observing Sheena's severe
bruising, continuous spasms, and the softness of Sheena's head. 35 Upon
Sheena's admittance to the hospital, Dr. Richard Lemen diagnosed her as
1261d.

1227State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536; 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997).
1 1d.at 538; 1048.
29
1 1d.

1301d.
13id.
132State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 538; 931 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Ariz. 1997).
13id.
1341d.

135Id
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"in cardiopulmonary arrest with extreme trauma," and detected a large
hemorrhage, which had caused the death of the right half of Sheena's
brain.136 Due to the nature of the injuries, Sheena's
condition was deemed
37
"hopeless" and she died seven days later.1
Dr. Lemen termed all of the injuries "non-accidental" and stated the
injuries could not be the product of "falling off of a toilet."' 3 In order to
result in the serious injuries Sheena displayed, Dr. Lemen contended
Sheena would have had to fall from an excess of twelve feet, suffer the
equivalent of a major car accident, or suffer repeated blows to the head
with a large object.139 In addition to Dr. Lemen's original diagnosis, other
doctors observed "branding bum marks" on the bottom of Sheena's feet,
a series of whip marks on Sheena's upper thigh and buttocks, cigarette
bum marks between Sheena's fingers, and bruising throughout Sheena's

head and body.140

When interviewed by the police, Mott alleged she had previously
confronted Near about suspicious bruises on Sheena "five or six times,"
but that she never4 reported the abuse because she did not want Near to
"get in trouble."' ' Although Mott stated that each time she approached
Near about the bruising, Near claimed Sheena had fallen, Mott also
admitted she did not truly believe Near's excuses. 42 Mott further
admitted to dressing Sheena in clothes that disguised the abuse and that
she declined to take Sheena to the hospital the night of the fatal injuries
because she did not want anyone else to see the bruises. 43 Yet, after Mott
1361d.
137State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 538; 931 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Ariz. 1997). Sce also Statev.
Mott, 183 Ariz. 191; 193, 901 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). There is a more detailed
summation of the case facts and the issues presented at trial listed in the appellate court decision,
therefore, some of the facts used in this section are taken from there rather than the Supreme Court
of Arizona opinion. All statements are footnoted appropriately.
"3"Mott, 187 Ariz. at 538.
1391d.

1401d.

'Id. Mott did not question Near "five or six times" on this particular occasion, but rather,
Mott stated there were five or six other incidents where Sheena had developed suspicious brui.:s.
Mott questioned Near on each of these occasions, but stated she did not believe the e cus s
proffered by Near.
142187 Ariz. 536, 538; 931 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Ariz. 1997).
143AMott, 187 Ariz. at 538-39.
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was indicted on first degree murder and two counts of"child abuse under
circumstances likely to produce death or serious bodily injury," Mott
claimed she "lacked the capacity to act" due to Battered Woman
Syndrome.' 44
The Expert Testimony
Mott was examined by Dr. Cheryl Karp, a licensed, certified clinical
psychologist specializing in child abuse, family violence, and sexual
abuse.' 45 Dr. Karp concluded that Mott possessed the characteristics of a
"battered woman" and had developed "learned helplessness," or a passive
acceptance to abuse common to BWS victims. 146 Due to the nature of the
syndrome and its associated mental disabilities, Dr. Karp stated her
opinion was that BWS adversely affected Mott's ability to protect her
children. 47 According to Karp, battered women such as Mott, develop a
"traumatic bond" with their abusers which inevitably results in feelings of
hopelessness, depression, and an inability to escape the abusive
environment.4 4 Further, battered women tend to believe what the batterer
says, lie to protect the batterer, and are often unable49to perceive danger or
to protect themselves or others from such danger.1
Thus, the essence of Dr. Karp's testimony was that Mott, due to her
history of abusive victimization in conjunction with her limited
intelligence, was mentally incapable of deciding to take Sheena to the
hospital in defiance of Near. 50 Mott's desire to introduce the expert
testimony was allegedly aimed at demonstrating how Mott lacked the
capacity to form the requisite mental state of knowledge or intent, not
5
aimed at excusing or mitigating her crime based on Near's abuse.' 1

144Id
'"State v. Mott, 183 Ariz. 191, 193; 901 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
146id.
47Id. Presumably, Karp was insinuating that the "passive acceptance of abuse" which
battered women develop, also transferred to her child. Therefore, Mott became passively
accepting to both her own abuse and the abuse of her child. A more thorough discussion of this
issue is4presented in the Analysis section infra p.__).
8id.
149Id.
"'187 Ariz. 536, 540; 931 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Ariz. 1997).
151id.
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The Trial
At trial, the prosecution moved to preclude the psychiatric evidence of
BWS claiming such testimony was only relevant in self-defense cases
where a woman kills her batterer.'5 2 After an offer of proof, the state
contended the expert testimony was nothing more than Dr. Karp's opinion
of Mott's mental state at the time of the crime and that this type of "state
of mind" opinion testimony was rejected by State v. Ortiz which only
allowed the admission of such testimony in furtherance of an insanity
defense. 153 As the state alleged, the testimony was not relevant to any
legally recognized defense, and therefore, the only motivation behind
Mott's proffered introduction was an illegal attempt to confuse the jury
with a "diminished
capacity defense," explicitly outlawed in Arizona by
1 54
State v. Ramos.
In rebuttal to these assertions, Mott claimed the BWS evidence
played an essential part in the defense by showing Mott was unable to
form the requisite intent to have acted "Imowingly or intentionally" as
required for a conviction of first degree murder or child abuse leading to
death or serious bodily injury." s As Mott stated, she sought not to use
BWS in conjunction with the complete "self-defense" defense as BWS
was traditionally used, but sought only to use the evidence to assist the
jury with their evaluation of "state of mind" or the "intent" aspect of the
accused crimes. 156 Because first degree murder and child abuse leading
to death or serious bodily injury required the state to prove intent, Molt
proffered the expert testimony to show why BWS
prevented her from
57
children.
her
protecting
and
making decisions
Initially, the trial court did allow the psychiatric testimony on the
assumption it may have illustrated Mott's "mental and emotional
capabilities. 1 5s But upon later objection, the court sided with the
" 2State v. Mott, 183 Ariz. 191, 193; 901 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).

'$'Id. at 194 (citing State v. Ortiz, 158 Ariz. 528; 764 P.2d 13 (Arz. 1988) (stating ab: nt
an insanity defense, Arizona does not allow an expert opinion on a defendant's state of mind at
the time of the offense)).
"WMott, 183 Ariz. at 194.
ISSd "
"56State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 540; 931 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Ariz. 1997).
'SMott, 183 Ariz. at 195.
"'State v. Mott, 183 Ariz. 191, 195; 901 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
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prosecution by excluding the evidence as an attempt to establish a
prohibited "diminished capacity" defense. 5 9 The jury found Mott guilty
of "knowing or intentional" child abuse likely60to produce death based on
Mott's failure to take Sheena to the hospital.1
The Appeal
The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed Mott's conviction after
determining the trial court's exclusion of BWS testimony violated Mott's
due process rights.' 61 Citing Christensen and Gonzales, the appellate
court noted that the BWS evidence concerned "character traits" common
to battered women and that evidence of such traits, if believed, may have
negated the element of knowledge or intent. 62 As the court continued, the
"traits" of a battered woman, just like the traits of mild retardation and
organic brain syndrome in Gonzales, were probative of Mott's behavior,
and may have assisted the jury in deciding that Mott did not act
"knowingly or intentionally" when she neglected to bring Sheena to the
hospital.' 63
The appellate court relied heavily on the testimony of Dr. Karp who
concluded Mott was a battered woman and that Mott's "learned
helplessness," a common trait of BWS, affected her ability to protect her
children.' 64 Karp's testimony stated "flat affect, unresponsiveness, and
inaction" were all common aspects of learned helplessness, a BWS trait
that Karp believed Mott possessed. 65 More precisely, K ap continued,
Mott formed a "traumatic bond" with Near which caused Mott to feel
isolated and incapable of escaping the relationship. 66 Because of these

"'State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 539; 931 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Ariz. 1997)
Mott was also found guilty of child abuse of a person under fifteen under

'60Id.

circumstances other than those likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. This was a lesser
offense than the class 2 felony of child abuse under circumstances likely to produce death and
serious bodily injury with which Mott was originally charged. Mott was convicted on this charge
due to her error in leaving her child alone with Near. Mott was also found guilty of felony murder.

"'Id.at 195.
'id. at 194-195.
"'State v. Mott, 183 Ariz. 191, 195; 901 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
"'Id.at 194; 1224.
1'65d.
'16Id
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BWS factors, Karp explained why Mott was unable to accurately perceive
danger or protect others from danger, why Mott failed to notice the
severity of Sheena's injuries, and why Mott believed Near when he lied
about the bruises and assured Mott everything would be "ok."' 67
Therefore, according to Karp, because of Mott's history of abuse from
Near and due to her arguably limited intelligence, Mott was "mentally
incapable" of maldng the decision as to whether or not Sheena needed
medical attention or required hospitalization.' 2
The appellate court cited Christensen,restating that the establishment
of a "character trait" of acting without reflection tended to establish
Christensen acted impulsively and therefore, did not premeditate the
homicide. 169 Similarly, the court held the BWS and "learned helplessness"
evidence was essentially the same as the character evidence admitted in
Christensen because it may have shown why Mott did not respond to
Sheena's injuries and how Mott "characteristically" lacked the ability to
make sound decisions due to her "traumatic bond" with Near.7 O
Referring next to the decision in Gonzales, the appellate court ruled the
BWS and "learned helplessness" evidence in Mott was also character
evidence similar to that admitted under Gonzales. In both cases, the court
reasoned the proffered evidence was essential to show inaction and
unresponsiveness, intent-based elements required for convictions of both
murder and child abuse leading to death based on failure to act.' 7 ' Thus,
the appellate court in Gonzales ruled the expert testimony was not a
"diminished capacity defense" since it sought not to relieve the defendant
from responsibility, but simply tended to negate the criminal intent or
"knowing" required for a conviction. Following suit, the appellate court
in Mott reversed the trial court's exclusion and remanded the case for
72
retrial.

"67State v. Mott, 183 Ariz 191, 194; 901 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
16id.
169Id.

1701d.
17Id.
"eState v. Mott, 183 Ariz 191, 195; 901 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
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The Supreme Court of Arizona Decision
The Supreme Court of Arizona agreed Mott's proffered testimony was
aimed at demonstrating Mott was not capable of forming the requisite
mental state of knowledge or intent and, therefore, was not an attempt to
excuse or justify the criminal actions. 173 However, citing Pohlot and
Cameron, the court noted psychiatric evidence to negate mens rea is still,
in fact, a "diminished capacity" or "diminished responsibility" admission
even though the evidence does not qualify as an affirmative "diminished
capacity" defense aimed at excusing, mitigating, or lessening moral
culpability due to psychological impairment.' 74 Therefore, by recognizing
the Arizona Criminal Code explicitly left out a provision which included
"diminished capacity," the Arizona Supreme Court deferred to legislative
intent, rejecting all expert psychological testimony short of insanity
whether it be presented as an affirmative defense, or even, as a challenge
175
to the mens rea element of a crime.
The court referred to their previous decision in Schantz by reiterating
the Arizona criminal law has refused to recognize a disease or defect of
the mind in which "volition does not exist ... as a defense to a prosecution
for a crime," and therefore, the sole standard for criminal responsibility in
Arizona remains the M'Naughten insanity test.7 6 Since BWS testimony
in Mott's case would only have presented evidence of mental defects short
of insanity, the court ruled the testimony of Dr. Karp was justifiably and
rightfully excluded from presentation at the trial level. 177 The court next
likened the Arizona Statute to the one at issue in Fisher,where the United
States Supreme Court refused to "force" the District of Columbia to allow
'73State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 540; 931 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Ariz. 1997)
.74 d. (citing U.S. v. Pohlot 827 F.2d 889 (3rd Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Cameron 907 F.2d 1051

(I I,, Cir. 1990)).
"7'Mot, 187 Ariz. at 541 (Ariz. 1997). Arizona has refused to adopt the MPC approach set
forth in the MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 401-402(1) and Commentaries, which allows the introduction

of evidence "whenever it [is] relevant to prove the defendant did or did not have a state of mind
that is an element of the defense" and recognizes mental defects short of insanity which may not
eliminate responsibility but rather, lessen the charge. See also Fisher v. U.S., 323 U.S. 463, (1946)
(discussing the M'Naughten Approach).

76
' Mott, 187 Ariz. at 541 (Ariz. 1997). See also State v. Schantz 98 Ariz. 200; 403 P.2d 521
(Ariz. 1981) (discussing M'Naughten as the sole "mental defect" based entirely on insanity tcst
for determining responsibility in Arizona).
'7Mott, 187 Ariz. at 541 (Ariz. 1997).
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evidence of mental deficiencies to assist the jury in determining elements
of premeditation and deliberation."' Since the exclusion of such
testimony did not violate the constitution in Fisher,precluding Mott from
presenting similar mental disability evidence to challenge mens rea
elements of her crime was consistent and likewise constitutional.'
Before addressing the cases relied upon by the dissent and Mott, the court
listed several federal circuits which have explicitly allowed states to
exclude expert testimony alleging a defendant "lacked the capacity" to
form specific intent. sO
The defense and dissent in Mott argued the court's ruling was
blatantly inconsistent with Christensen and Gonzales since those cases
allowed psychiatric testimony to show how mentally deficient character
traits may indeed affect "knowingly" or "intentional" requirements.'
However, the court distinguished Mott from Christensenby stating the
proffered testimony in Christensen did not claim the defendant was
incapableof premeditating or deliberating by reason of mental defect as
in Mott. Rather, Christensen claimed he had a tendency to act
impulsively, and therefore, truly did not premeditate the homicide, '2
Unable to distinguish and justify their prior decision in Gonzales,
however, the court overruled the portion of Gonzales which allowed
expert testimony regarding a defendant's mental capacity to challenge the
requisite mental state of a charged crime.1'S3 The Alott court stated
Gonzales was incorrect, because the proffered testimony was essentially
an expert opinion on Gonzales' cognitive ability to form the requisite

7

'State v.Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 541; 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 1997).
at 541; 1041. See Fisher,328 U.S. at 463.
'Mott, 187 Aiz. at 543. See Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124, 1144-45 (7th Cir. 1933);
Hans v. Abrahamson, 910 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1990); Welcome v. Blackburn, 793 F.2d 672,
674 (5th Cir. 1986); Campbell v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1573, 151l (11th Cir. 1984); Wahrlick
v. Arizona, 479 F.2d 1137, 1138 (9th Cir. 1973).
1
..Mott, 187 Ariz. at 543 (Ariz. 1997).
"Id. See State v. Chistensen, 129 Ariz. 32; 628 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1981).
79

1 1d.

reState v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 544; 931 P.2d 1046, 1054 (Ariz. 1997). Sce State v.
Gonzales, 140 Ariz. 349; 681 P.2d 1368 (Ariz. 1980).
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mental state, distinguishable from Christensen and previously deemed
inadmissible as "diminished capacity" evidence under Schantz.'84
The Court next turned to federal precedent citing Cameron, where
psychiatric evidence that defendant was incapable of forming the
necessary intent was excluded, because the alleged "incapacity" was
actually a claimed inability to reflect on or control the behaviors that
produced criminal conduct.'85 The Mott court agreed with the Cameron
decision that such evidence did not negate specific intent because, only in
extraordinary circumstances, would a defendant actually lack the capacity
to form "legal" mens rea.186 Even though Cameron may not have reflected
on the consequences of her behaviors, her purposeful activity was all the
law required to satisfy intent. Further, noting Pohlot, even the most
psychiatrically ill have the capacity to form intentions and the existence
87
of intention, as opposed to reflection, was all mens rea required.1
Applying these standards to Mott, the court stated although she may
not have been able to reflect on the consequences or severity of her
actions, Molt did indeed act purposely by not rendering assistance, or
delivering Sheena to medical care.' 88 Mott was deemed capable of
recognizing her child needed medical care; because she admitted the only
reason she delayed bringing Sheena to the hospital was to hide Sheena's
bruises and prevent the Department of Social Services from taking Sheena
away, not because she was unable to perceive the danger of Sheena's
injuries.'89 As in Pohlot,the court ruled Mott's purposeful activity was all
the law required and noted that no federal court would excuse Mott's
conscious failure to assist her dying child simply because she was
motivated by unconscious influences or products of her environment. 9 '
Because Pohlot ruled mens rea was satisfied by any purposeful activity
regardless of psychological origins, the Arizona Supreme Court held Mott

" 4Molt, 187 Ariz. at 544 (Ariz. 1997). See State v. Schantz 98 Ariz. 200; 403 P.2d 521
(Ariz. 1981).
...Mott, 187 Ariz. at 542-43 (Ariz. 1997).
18
id. See Chistensen, 129 Ariz. at 32.
"'fMott, 187 Ariz. at 543 (Ariz. 1997); see U.S. v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3rd Cir. 1987).

...State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 543; 931 P.2d 1046, 1053 (Ariz. 1997).
189Id.
19Id. See Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 889.
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was rightfully precluded from introducing BWS testimony, because such
testimony
would not have supported a "legally acceptable theory of mens
19, 1
rea.

ANALYSIS
The Expert Testimony Itself
Before addressing the legal issues and analysis in Mott, it is important to
discuss some of the obvious inconsistencies with Dr. Karp's BWS
testimony and how this applies in the child abuse context, as compared to
how the traditional notions of BWS apply in the self-defense setting where
a battered woman kills her abuser.' 9 Even assuming all of the legal
arguments would not disqualify Mott's BWS evidence, a closer
examination of the evidence itself, and its proffered purpose, clearly reveal
why BWS should not apply outside the context of self-defense. By
exploring BWS more in depth, it will be clear to see why such an ill-fated
application, which Dr. Karp and Mott support, is plagued with psychiatric
holes of theoretical inconsistency.
Lenore E. Walker, a psychologist who has been an expert witness, is
considered by many to be the developer, and nation's finest expert on
BWS. In her book, TerrifyingLove, Walker states that battered women
who kill their abusers must be seen as acting normally, not abnormally.' 93
Further, Walker states women who kill their abusers develop a
"heightened perception of imminence" and kill in mere self-defense based
on a "reasonably perceived imminent danger."' 194 Because of this
perceived danger, BWS testimony is used to develop the complete,
affirmative defense of self-defense, and not to excuse the killing or gain
"jury sympathy" due to the battered woman's violent history.' BWS is

191

Mfott, 187 Ariz. at 543 (Ariz. 1997); see Pohlot, 827 F.2d at SS9.
case discussion above, Dr. Cheryl Karp, Ph.D. was hired by the defense

'5'As noted in the

to examine Mott and to testify about the possible effects of BWS upon Mott. See Mott, 187 Ariz.

at 539 (Ariz.
1997).
93

1 LENORE E. VALKER, TERRIFYING LoVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN 1 ILL Ar.D

SOCIETY
1 REsPONDs 169 (199).

94Id.

195Id.

How
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used only to show the average non-battered juror why the perceptions and
actions of the battered woman in killing her batterer were legally
reasonable,not why those actions should bejustified.
Although in its traditional self-defense usage, BWS evidence
contributes to the legally acceptable theory of self defense, such is simply
not the case with Mott. The BWS evidence does not contribute to a
legally acceptable theory since Arizona does not allow a "diminished
capacity" defense short of insanity.'9 6 Traditional BWS evidence used to
establish self-defense is similar to the admission of BWS evidence aimed
at assisting in the development of a "coercion" defense, because both are
legally acceptable theories. 1" If Arizona had allowed a "diminished
capacity" defense, theoretically, the BWS evidence may have been used
to negate specific intent. But quite simply, as the law in Arizona stands,
there is no legally acceptable theory of mens rea to which BWS can be
applied in Mott's case. 198 Mott was not, nor did she ever claim to be,
coerced or acting in self-defense when she neglected Sheena by denying
her necessary medical attention.
If consistent with Walker's theory of BWS, Mott's neglect would
have been normal, reasonable, or even justified, thereby diminishing her
responsibility and essentially "excusing" her conduct. 99 However, BWS
does not cause mental disease or defects, but rather the theory is meant to
explain why the battered woman's behavior was reasonable. This theory
is simply inapplicable to Mott; the victim is Sheena, the child, not Mott,
the alleged battered woman. Unlike a battered woman who perceives
imminent bodily injury when she kills her abuser, Mott did not perceive
"imminent bodily injury" to herself or her child when she neglected to

'9See State v. Willoughby, 181 Ariz. 530, 538; 892 P.2d 1319, 1327 (Ariz. 1995); State v.
Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200; 403 P.2d 521 (Ariz. 1981).
9
1'
See State v. Lambert, 173 W.Va. 60; 312 S.E.2d 31 (,V. Va. 1984) (deronstrating where
evidence of a history of domestic abuse was accepted as a factor that may negate criminal intent.
The domestic abuse evidence did not stand alone however; it was used to help liustrate a legally

acceptable "coercion" defense which, if believed, would have negated intent.).
98

See State v. Ramos, 133 Ariz. 4; 648 P.2d 119 (Ariz. 1982) (citing A.R.S. § 13-502(A)
(where the court stated the sole test for criminal responsibility in Arizona is the M'Naughten test
for insanity).
"See WALKER, supra note 193.
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take Sheena to the hospital." 0 BWS is used to show why action against
the battereris reasonable, not why action or inaction against an innocent
thirdpartyis reasonable. There is simply no possible theoretical bridge
to the child abuse setting.
Mott worried about Sheena, consulted friends, was well aware of the
seriousness of the injuries and, in the end, did indeed allow Sheena to be
taken to the hospita 2 °1 Yet, the central question remains: exactly why did
Mott delay in hospitalizing Sheena? Her conduct was not due to a
reasonably perceived fear of imminent abuse at the hands of Near. Nor
was her action based on a belief that, because she had to delay assistance
until Near was gone in order to protect herself and Sheena from further,
"imminent," abuse. On the contrary, Mott, in her own statements,
admittedly delayed for three simple reasons:
(1) she feared the doctors would see Sheena's bruises;
(2) she feared Sheena would be taken away "by the authorities;" and
(3) she wanted to protect Near and prevent him from "getting in
trouble."202
BWS causes reasonable fear based on a heightened perception of
imminent danger; it is not intended to shield liability for the "selfish
fear"
rationale Mott asserts. Quite simply, Mott cannot be justified based on
BWS for delaying Sheena's hospitalization.0 3
Yet, even if we were to ignore Mott's self-damaging statements and
evaluate the BWS evidence solely on the rationale of Dr. Karp, similar
inconsistencies with traditional BWS theory would surface. Primarily,
Karp asserted Mott was unable to recognize the danger or seriousness of
Sheena's injuries.2 4 Karp further stated that due to Near's abuse, Mott
mentally and psychologically "lacked the capacity" to act and "lacked the

20

See State v. Mott, 1S7 Ariz. 536,538; 931 P.2d 1046, 104S (Ariz. 1997).
Md

201

zrJId.
2

'See WALKER, supra note 193 (stating BWS assists the jury by showing them why the
ittered woman has a more acute perception of imminence, a more justified fear under the
rcumstances than a non-battered woman).
"WMott, 187 Ariz. at 539 (Ariz. 1997).
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capacity" to sense danger or protect others from it.205 This frivolous
assertion goes against the very heart of the BWS theory. As Walker
states, the primary use for BWS testimony in self-defense settings is to
show how the battered woman has a heightenedperception of danger and
imminence, a better understanding of where and when imminent bodily
injury will occur based on the cycle of abuse. 2 6 This heightened
perception is what provides the battered woman with the ability
to protect
20 7
abuser.
her
kill
to
way...
reasonable
only
the
in
herself
If consistent with BWS theory, Mott would not be unableto perceive
danger as Dr. Karp claimed, but rather she would have been more aware
of the danger, and thus better able to perceive Sheena's imminent injuries
than a non-battered woman. Mott did not argue that BWS prevented her
from coming to the punctual aid of Sheena, because she feared
"imminent" repercussions from Near. Nor did Mott claim she was better
able to perceive the danger and, therefore, was acting in Sheena's best
interest by delaying Sheena's delivery to the hospital until Near was not
present. Mott delayed the hospitalization due to the fear of legal
prosecution of herself and Near and because she feared losing custody of
Sheena to "the authorities., 20 8 There was simply no indication, neither
explicit nor perceived threat, that Mott claimed as the underlying reason
she delayed Sheena's hospitalization. Her own testimony rebuts such an
assertion and, therefore, is highly inconsistent with BWS theory. Again,
there is simply no connection that can be drawn between reasonable action
against a batterer and inaction or abuse of a third party as in Mott's case.
The two theories are plainly distinct and wholly irreconcilable.
In BWS, the battered woman's only hope to escape injury is to kill
her batterer . . . it is the last straw and final option to stop the lifi
threatening pattern of abuse. 0 9 It is unreasonable to assert that abusing o:
failing to come to the aid of one's child can be seen as the only option, th,
"last resort" to an abusive situation. Mott was free to take Sheena to th
2

0SSee State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 539; 931 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Ariz. 1997).
'06See WALKER, supra note 193, at 169 (discussing how the battered woman can bet
perceive
danger and imminence than the non-battered woman).
207
1d.
203
Mott, 187 Ariz. at 538 (Ariz. 1997).

"WSee WALKER, supra note 193.
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hospital as evidenced by the fact she actually did allow Sheena to be taken
to the hospital the day following the severe abuse."' 0 She did not have to
delay, consult friends, or21 "wait to see if she comes out of it" as Mott
herself, stated she had. ' Karp's extensive, technical testimony of
"learned helplessness" and the "traumatic bond" was somewhat accurate
and may have shown why Mott lied to protect Near or failed to leave the
relationship; however, it showed no connection to Mott's relationship and
her negligent behavior toward Sheena2
The testimony showed nothing as to why Mot did not bring Sheena
to the hospital when Mott was fully aware, and indeed quite worried,
about the seriousness of Sheena's injuries.21 3 Even if the "traumatic bond"
caused Mott to believe Near's assurances that Sheena would be alright;
there is no reason Mott would have disbelieved the assertions of her
friend, the former paramedic. The paramedic was, in all likelihood, very
qualified to determine the seriousness of Sheena's condition. However,
after several requests and offers to take Sheena to the hospital himself, the
paramedic was repeatedly refused by Mott and Near. Mott may have
tended to believe Near, but there is no rational reason associated with
BWS that would have caused Mott to disbelieve or not trust in the veracity
of the paramedic's concern. Mott claimed no threat, no imminent fear,
and no "danger" which prevented her from taking Sheena to the hospital.
Her unreasonable inaction simply cannot be analogized to the fully
reasonable action of a true battered woman in a self-defense case.?t 4
The Mott decision never reached these inconsistencies, however, as
the testimony could not match up to the precedent legal standards in both
federal and Arizona state court. Assuming as the court did, however, that
the BWS testimony was indeed valid psychiatric testimony consistent with

2

MoState v. Mott, 183 Ariz. 191, 193; 901 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Ariz. CL App. 1995) (presenting

how Mott claimed it was her own idea to take Sheena to the hospital when she could not wake
Sheena2 1the next morning.).

ld.
2'2See Statev. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536,539-40; 931 P.2d 1046, 1049-50 (Ariz. 1997); Aoll, 183

Ariz. 191,
193; 901 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
213
See WALKER, supra note 193.
2 4
" See id. In self-defense, the action of killing the abuser is seen as reasonable due to the

imminent threat of ongoing abuse in the BWS relationship.
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the traditional notions and standards of BWS, the Arizona Court
nonetheless correctly excluded Mott's testimony on two grounds:
(1) the testimony was unacceptable due to Arizona's refusal to adopt
"diminished capacity" defenses in its criminal law; and
(2) Arizona's exclusion of such testimony did not violate Due Process. u
Arizona Refusal of Diminished Capacity
Mott's primary argument for the expert testimony admission was based on
the theory that Mott's battered history and limited intellectual ability
rebutted the state's evidence that Mott possessed the requisite specific
intent.1 6 Mott strongly, yet mistakenly, stated she did not seek to
introduce the BWS evidence as an "affmnative defense" to excuse or
mitigate her responsibility in neglecting or abusing Sheena.2 7 This
distinction between psychiatric testimony of mental defect as a defense
itself and psychiatric evidence to negate an element of the crime was
drawn and defined as "diminished capacity" or "diminished
responsibility" in Pohlot.218 It is important to note that "diminished
capacity" or the use of such evidence is not necessarily prohibited and
would have been allowed in Pohlot had such evidence contributed to a
"legally acceptable theory of mens rea."2 19 Further, Cameron reiterated
the distinction by differentiating "diminished capacity" mens rea defenses
from those affirmative defenses which excuse, mitigate, or lessen a
defendant's moral culpability due to her psychological impairment."2 '
Following the guiding standards of these precedents, it would have
initially seemed Mott had a strong argument for admission by claiming the
psychiatric testimony related to her lack of capacity to form mens rea.
However, although Mott's testimony may have indeed tended to
negate mens rea, the Arizona legislature and courts have plainly, clearly,
and repeatedly refused to accept expert testimony regarding mental defects
21

SMott, 187 Ariz. at 540-44 (Ariz. 1997).

216

d. at 540.

217

State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 540; 931 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Ariz. 1997).
2 18
U.S. v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3rd Cir. 1987).
2 19

1d.

"U.S. v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051; 1062-1063 (11th Cir. 1990).
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short of insanity to negate such intent."' As the court illustrated, Arizona
refused to adopt section 4.02(1) of the MPC which allowed the admission
of evidence that a defendant "suffered from a mental disease or defect..
*whenever it was relevant to prove the defendant did or did not have a
state of mind that is an element of the defense. ' ' 2m This section of the
MPC recognized that while "mental defects" of insanity could effectively
eliminate responsibility, lesser degrees of mental defect may tend to
negate intent and therefore, lessen the charge tm
Although the MPC theory is plausible, the Arizona legislature was
not bound to the MPC "guidelines" and was free to reject this troublesome
and inherently "jury confusing" section." As the Mott court correctly
interpreted, the legislature's decision not to adopt this section clearly
evidenced rejection of the use of psychological testimony short of insanity
to challenge the mens rea element of a crime.'m Quite simply, Mott's
psychological testimony may have contributed to her personal theory of
inaction, but it was the Arizona legislature's sole prerogative to deny such
misleading evidence from entering the criminal law realm in Arizona.
This deference to the legislature and the validity of Mott's exclusion
was further strengthened by the Arizona decision in Schantz, where the
court faced an issue nearly identical to the one presented by Mott. 26
Schantz claimed his mental deficiencies were so severe that his actions
were outside of deliberate, volitional control and therefore, he lacked the
capacity to contrive and design the crime.' However, the Schantz court
refused to instruct the jury to weigh evidence of Schantz's mental
deficiencies when determining whether Schantz possessed the required
malice aforethought for first degree murder.'2 8 The court stated such a
"volitional prong" defense was nothing less than a "diminished capacity

2'Mott, 187 Ariz. at 540 (Ariz. 1997).
2' State

v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 540; 931 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Ariz. 1997) (citing MODEL

PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 4.02(1) cmt. 1 (1985)).
'Id. This is precisely the distinction. Mental defects which lessen the charge (i.c., from
murder to manslaughter), result in "diminished responsibility" or a less culpable offense.
"4Id. at 542; 1052 (citing U.S. v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 903 (3rd. Cir. 1990)).
2'Afott, 187 Ariz. at 540 (Ariz. 1997).

"'See State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200; 403 P.2d 521 (Ariz. 1965).
2'7Id. at

205.
"'Id.at 212.
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due to mental derangement" defense, quite distinguishable from
"cognitive insanity" as understood, accepted, and allowed under
229
M'Naughten.
Similarly, Mott did not claim she lacked the cognitive ability to have
intent. Rather, Mott essentially claimed she lacked the volitional capacity
to "intend or [act] know[ingly]" and was unable to conform her volitional
conduct to the requirements of law."0 Yet, just as in Schanez, such a "lack
of volitional control" claim is precisely what Arizona refused to recognize
by not adopting the MPC approach allowing mental defect evidence to
negate specific intent.231 Because Arizona has not recognized a defect of
the mind where volition does not exist, the exclusion regarding such was
rightfully extended to the BWS testimony in Mott's case. Arizona will
not allow psychiatric evidence short of insanity because it simply does not
believe that BWS or any other mentally debilitating syndrome will result
2 2"
in an inability to choose a course of action as is the case with insanity.
After recognizing the legislative intent to exclude "diminished
capacity," the court strengthened its position by noting numerous other
Arizona decisions that have excluded diminished capacity evidence to
negate specific intent.233 Situations similar to Mott arose in Laffoon and
Ramos, where each defendant tried to raise voluntary intoxication, not as
an affirmative defense, but to show how severe alcoholic effects prevented
them from forming specific intent.234 In both cases, the Arizona court
ruled that, while drunkenness may loosen inhibitions and hamper
judgments, even the most severely drank will be aware of what they are
doing and have the requisite volitionalprocessesrequired for mens rea.235
The court correctly likened this explication to Mott by reiterating that
Arizona has refused to recognize any mental deficiencies, whether it be
229Id.
23'State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 543; 931 P.2d 1046, 1053 (Ariz. 1997).
2'"Id at 540; 1050; see State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200,212; 403 P.2d 521., 529 (Ariz. 1965).
'2 2Mott, 187 Ariz. at 543 (Ariz. 1997).
'Id. at 541 (citing State v. Ramos, 133 Ariz. 4, 6; 648 P.2d 119, 121 (Ariz. 1982); State
v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484,486; 610 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Ariz. 1980); State v. Briggs, 112 Ariz. 379,
382; 542 P.2d 804, 807 (Ariz. 1975). Each of the cited cases followed the Arizona decision in
Schantz refusing to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent.
24
3 See Ramos, 133 Ariz. at 6; Laffoon, 125 Ariz. at 486.
25
' SeeRamos, 133 Ariz. at 6; Laffoon, 125 Ariz. at 486.
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from voluntary intoxication or BWS, because Arizona simply does not
believe that short of insanity, one does not possess volitional control or
conscious awareness of her actions. 2 6
As the Ramos court stated and the Mott court correctly concurred, the
sole test for criminal responsibility in Arizona is insanity: "a person is not
responsible for criminal conduct by reason of insanity if at the time of
such conduct the person was suffering from such a mental disease or
defect as not to know the nature and quality of the actor, if such person did
' 37
know, that such person did not know what he was doing was wrong."
Mott clearly did not assert insanity, for although she may not have
reflected upon the consequences of her denial of medical attention, Mott
was "consciously aware" of her actions and was able to make choices as
evidenced by her eventual delivery of Sheena to the hospital2" This
volitional control, according to Arizona law, can only be absent in cases
of insanity, and thus is the only situation where Arizona will allow
psychiatric testimony regarding such.2 9
Truly, Mott was overly optimistic to think the court, sua sponte,
would recognize BWS as the first mental defect/syndrome in Arizona to
have such "volitional control preventing" power. The precedent cases
clearly and unequivocally rejected the entire realm of "diminished
capacity" defenses and evidence and thus, Mott's assertion that she
desired only to negate specific intent was frivolous and irrelevant. 49 No
matter the intended use or purpose, Arizona has prohibited all mental
defect evidence short of that supporting the M'Naughten insanity test as
24
set forth in Ramos and Laffoon. 1

' 6State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 541; 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 1997) (citing State v.
Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 212; 403 P.2d 521,529 (Ariz. 1965)).
'Mot, 187 Ariz. at 541 (Ariz. 1997) (citing A.R.S. § 13-502-A (emphasis addcd)).
2"Mott, 187 Ariz. at 543 (Ariz. 1997).
23s'r
d
24

See State v. Ramos, 133 Axiz. 4,6; 64S P.2d 119, 121 (Ariz. 1982); State v. Laffoon, 125
Ariz. 4S4, 486; 610 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Ariz. 1980); State v. Briggs, 112 Ariz. 379, 3S2; 542 P.2d
804, 807
(Ariz. 1975); State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 212; 403 P.2d 521,529 (Ariz. 1965).
241
See Ramos, 133 Ariz. at 6; Laffoon, 125 Ariz.at 486.

892

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 1:855

The Due Process Claim
Unable to deny that her evidence fell into the well established Arizona
definition and exclusion of "diminished capacity," Mott next claimed the
Arizona law preventing her from introducing expert testimony to show
lack of intent denied her Due Process and was therefore,
unconstitutional.242 Yet, this misguided assertion from Mott wholly
243 The
overlooks the United States Supreme Court decision in Fisher.
Mott court was correct in discounting Mott's erroneous Due Process claim
by stating the fundamental law, as set forth in Fisher, gave states the
freedom to decide whether or not to admit psychiatric evidence short of
insanity to disprove or rebut evidence of premeditation or intent. 4
Although the M'Naughten insanity defense is a constitutional guarantee,
BWS is admittedly not an insanity-type defense and therefore, is not
required under the Fisherdoctrine. 45
In Fisher, the defendant argued the District of Columbia law
precluding him from introducing mental defect evidence attributing to his
lack of premeditation, violated due process. 24 6 However, the Supreme
Court explicitly stated they would not "force" the District of Columbia to
require such admissions, and further held that states were free to preclude
psychological evidence of mental deficiencies to negate elements of a
crime, without as Mott contends, violating the constitution.2 7 Whether it
be to show lack of premeditation as in Fisher,or lack of intent as in Mott,
the precluded admissions in both cases attempted to introduce mental
defects short of insanity to disprove elements of the crimes charged.248
There is no reason to believe the constitution would require admission in
Mott's case and effectively "force" Arizona to adopt such a rule of
evidence in their criminal law, while at the same time, give deference to
the District of Columbia's legislature to reject an identical rule of evidence
242

State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 541; 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 1997).

243See Fisher v. U.S., 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
244Mott, 187 Ariz. at 541 (Ariz. 1997) (citing Fisher v. U.S., 328 U.S. 463 (1946)).
24

SSee Fisher,328 U.S. at 463 (demonstrating where mental defects short of insanity are not
required to protect due process, whereas including a provision allowing for an insanity defense in
the state
criminal law is required for due process).
246
1d. at 470.

247

248 d.

at 476. See Mott, 187 Ariz. at 541 (Ariz. 1997).
See Fisher,328 U.S. at 470; Mott, 187 Ariz. at 541 (Ariz. 1997).
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in Fisher. Although expert testimony may have shown Mott did suffer
from BWS, just as expert testimony may have shown Fisher was indeed
below average intelligence, these types of mental impairments which do
not amount to insanity are simply not constitutionally required under
Fisher.249
Even if Arizona criminal law did allow "diminished
capacity" evidence to negate intent elements of a crime, Mott's claim
would remain without merit because the BWS evidence she sought to
introduce would not, consistent with federal and state precedent,
contribute to a legitimate legal theory of niens rea O° In Pohlot,the court
stated mental deficiency evidence may indeed be used to negate specific
intent, even though such evidence is not required by the Fisherdecision. 2s
Regardless, the court rejected the use of Pohlot's proffered evidence
because it did not contribute to a legally acceptable theory of mens rea.2
Although the Insanity Defense Reform Act was ruled only to preclude
diminished capacity defenses on their own, the Pohlot court ruled that
even if thejury believed Pohlot's mental deficiency psychiatric evidence,
it would still have failed to release Pohlot from legal responsibility." 3
This same theory is easily applied to Mott. Even if the above arguments
were all decided in Mott's favor and the BWS evidence was admitted, it
would still fail to illustrate why Mott was not fully liable through lack of
mens rea2 5 4 The following discussion is illustrative.
As explained in Pohlot, only in extraordinary cases will even the
most psychiatrically ill "lack the capacity" to form specific intent as

24

See Fisher v. U.S., 328 U.S. 463, 470 (1946).
"'°See U.S. v. Pohlot 827 F.2d 889 (3rd Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051 (1 th
Cir. 1990). An illustrative example of where psychiatric evidence may be introduced to assist the
jury in deciding on a legally acceptable theory of nzens rca can be found in State v, Lambert. State
v. Lambert, 173 W.Va. 60; 312 S.E.2d 31 (W. Va. 1984). There, the defendant woman was on
trial for child abuse and used her history of abuse to help prove her defense of coercion. She
claimed she lacked the intent to commit the abuse because she was coerced into committing it with
her abuser. Therefore, the psychiatric testimony contributed to a legally acceptable theory of tcans
rea ... the theory of coercion. The distinction in Mott is simply that Mott lacked the capacity to

form intent; this is not a legally acceptable theory of nins rca except in the area of insanity.
'221Pohlot,827 F.2d at 903.
2 Id.
23Id.
2"State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 543; 931 P.2d 1046, 1053 (Ariz- 1997).

894

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 1:855

traditionally understood in criminal law.2 5 The problem with psychiatric
testimony of mental disease or defect is that it confuses the jury, focusing
their attention on whether the defendant was capable of forming intent
25 6
rather than the true legal question of whether there actually was intent.
The evaluation of a defendant's criminal responsibility looks to the
defendant's conscious awareness and therefore, any showing of
purposeful activity usually satisfies mens rea.257 Pohlot purposely
planned, and Mott purposely neglected, regardless of whether either
defendant had the "capacity" to reflect upon or "intend" the criminal end
result. Unless Mott was completely oblivious as to what was going on,
and unless she was thoroughly unaware of Sheena's condition to the point
of insanity, the BWS evidence was irrelevant. 8
As in Cameron, the prosecution in Mott need not have shown Mott
intended for Sheena to die or even that Mott knowingly understoodthat
the delay in taking Sheena to the hospital would lead to death. The
prosecution was merely required to show Mott was consciously aware of
the injuries themselves, consciously aware that she was delaying Sheena's
necessary admittance to the hospital.259 It is Mott's conscious awareness
of her own behaviors, not the awareness or evaluation of the potential
outcome of those behaviors, which satisfies intent. 6°
Although Mott may not have noticed the severe detriment a delay in
treatment caused, she nonetheless was aware that she was delaying needed
treatment. Mott was aware that Sheena was injured as evidenced by
Mott's continuous "checking up" on Sheena the night of the abuse and
also by Mott's episodic crying and consultation with neighbors the
morning following the abuse.26 1 She was fully capable of realizing her
daughter was injured and, in fact, pleaded with her boyfriend several times

"U.S. v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 903 (3rd Cir. 1987).
' 6Id. at 903-904.
2'Id.at 904.
258 See WALKER, supra note 193. Traditional BWS would not support uch an assertion
because battered women are very alert and aware of their actions in the self-defense setting.
2 9
2'6 See U.S. v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1067 (11 th Cir. 1990).
Oid.
26
State v. Mott, 183 Ariz. 191, 193; 901 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).

BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME

1997]

the night before to allow Sheena to be taken to the hospital.2P2 In addition,
although Mott claimed she was confused, she was "aware" as shown by
her desire to prevent anyone at the hospital from seeing Sheena's
bruises.26 All of the activities, like Pohlot's extensive planning and
scheming, were purposeful and clearly evidenced Mott's delay was not
done "uncontrollably" or without conscious awareness. Mott did not
consciously "wake up" to the severity of the abuse only after Sheena's
death; but on the contrary, Mott mew of the danger all along. Such
conscious awareness and purposeful activity, whether motivated by fear,
anger, or some other psychological origin, is irrelevant in determining
mens rea because it does not contribute to a legally acceptable theory of
mens rea such as self-defense, as BWS is traditionally used.64
It is also worthy to note that, if anything, the facts and mental
circumstances in Pohlotmore closely resemble the traditional notions of
BWS than those contained in Mott. In Pohlot, the husband claimed he
was unable to appreciate or reflect upon the consequences of hiring
someone to kill his xvife. 26' He claimed the history of manipulation, and
psychological and physical abuse influenced his decision to hire a killer
without contemplating the consequences or recognizing the effects?( 5 The
connection in Pohlotwas allegedly direct: the abuse triggering the murder
plot may have been seen as the only way out of Pohlot's abusive
relationship, the only way to prevent imminent physical abuse at the hands
of his wife.267 Yet, there is no direct connection found in Mott. Mott
claimed the abuse she suffered under Near prevented her from helping her
daughter ... creating a much more tenuous relationship between the facts

2

"Id. Returning to the testimony of the paramedic "friend," even if Mott had believed Near,
which she admits she did not, Mott still had no reason to disbelieve the paramedic. Certainly, it
is quite reasonable to think Mott was alerted to Sheena's serious condition after the repeated
warnings from the highly qualified paramedic.
2
OState v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 543; 931 P.2d 1046, 1053 (Ariz. 1997).
2

U.S. v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 903 (3rd Cir. 1987).
1d. at 893.

5See

265

2651d.
26
7d. See WALKER, supra note 193 (establishing that when a battered woman kills her
abuser, it is because the battered woman sees the killing as the only way out, the last option

available to prevent further imminent and severe abuse).
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presented than had Mott acted out against Near or even neglected to help
him in a life-threatening situation.268
Further, evidence against a legal acceptance of Mott's BWS theory
of mens rea came from the court's analysis of Cameron.269 Just as in
Mott, Cameron claimed her mental defect of schizophrenia rendered her
"incapable" of forming the specific intent to commit the crimes charged.270
Mott argued that her mental defects, although not qualifying as insanity,
tended to show she was incapable of "knowingly" allowing Sheena to die
just as Cameron was incapable of intending to distribute drugs. 271
However, as the Cameron court stated, in most instances where a
defendant claims she is "incapable" of forming intent, she is not referring
to "intent" in the traditional sense of the word. Rather, most "incapacity
to form intent" defenses are actually confused with, and rooted in, an
inability to reflect on the long-term consequences or "volitionally control"
the behaviors which produced criminal conduct. 72 These notions of lack
of reflection or lack of volitional control are not acceptable theories of
mens rea because, as stated in Pohlot,defendants often act not intending
or realizing the end 27result
of their actions, yet the purposeful actor remains
3
guilty nonetheless.
In Mott, the essence of Mott's assertion was that she was unable to
realize the seriousness of Sheena's condition, or in other words, she was
unable to see the potential effects of not taking Sheena to the hospital.274
Even if such an assertion were believed, which is unlikely since Mott's
own statements cast sincere doubts upon such, the evidence would still
have been unacceptable. Mott was not psychologically prevented from
acting to save Sheena, as evidenced by the fact that she did allow Sheena
26

SThis does not suggest that the Pohlot decision was incorrect by any sense. It merely
demonstrates that the connection in Pohlot (i.e., battered vs. batterer) wa3 more similar to
traditional BWS evidence in self-defense than the connection, or lack thereof, in Mott (i.e.,
battered woman v. battered child).
269

See U.S. v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051 (11th Cir. 1990).

270

1d. at 1056.

"ISee State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 543; 931 p.2d 1046, 1053 (Ariz. 1997); Cameron, 907
F.2d at 1067.
2
"Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1066.
27
U.S. v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 907 (3rd Cir. 1987).
274
Mott, 187 Ariz. at 540 (Ariz. 1990).
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to be taken to the hospital the following day.275 She may not have
perceived the danger in delaying Sheena's admittance; she may not have
reflected on the fact that Sheena may die due to her boyfriend's abuse.
However, Mott did not lack the capacity to purposefully act, which is all
the law required. 276
Mott is likewise distinguishable from Staggs where expert testimony
was admitted because it did, indeed contribute to a legally acceptable
theory of mens rea.2 " In Staggs, the court admitted psychiatric evidence
that may have shown it was improbable that the defendant had made the
threat charged. 278 Unlike Mott, however, Staggs did not claim that he
lacked the volitional control or was influenced by some unconscious
motivation when threatening to kill a police officer.279 Staggs claimed he
characteristicallyacted without reflection and therefore, most likely did
the same in the charged circumstance. 2 1, Conversely, Mott did not claim
that she was a characteristically irresponsible person and therefore it was
unlikely she caused Sheena's death by abuse. Mott claimed precisely
what Staggs prohibited: that Mott did not have the capacity to form
"knowing or intention" because she lacked volitional control and was
unconsciously prevented by BWS from making the decision to take
Sheena to the hospital.2 1 Staggs did not argue he was incapable of the
requisite mental state because of severe mental deficiencies, he argued it
was unlikely he actually did have the requisite mental state because of
characteristic deficiencies. 2 2 The former is a pure example of "diminished
responsibility."
This same rationale was used to preclude testimony similar to Mott's
in White.283 There, defendant White attempted to introduce testimony that
25
1

See id.

276

See State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536,543; 931 P.2d 1046, 1053 (Ariz. 1997); Sce also Pohlot,
827 F.2d at 907 (stating mens rea is generally satisfied by any showing ofpurpomaful activity,

regardless of its psychological origins).
2
U.S. v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987).
27-'See
8
id.
279
1d.
2EDId.
2"State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 540; 931 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Ariz. 1997).
' 2See U.S. v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987).
'See U.S. v. White, 766 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1985).
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she lacked the ability to form the requisite intent to distribute cocaine due
to the domination by White's mother.2" Just as White alleged her mother
psychologically compelled her to act, Mott claimed Near's abuse
psychologically prevented her from acting on Sheena's behalf."' 5 In both
cases, unconscious motivations and a lack of volitional control were
proffered as defenses, yet both are distinguishable from the true lack of
intent found in Staggs. 286 Further, the White court stated the "good
motive" of being psychologically compelled to distribute cocaine to "help
her mother" was irrelevant since White was cognizant that the law was
being violated by her proscribed actions.287 Similarly, in Mott, even if
Mott's long-term motivation was to protect the child, evidence illustrating
such would be irrelevant since Mott was cognizant the law was being
broken. Mott was well aware of the abuse, well aware her daughter
needed medical attention and was thus, cognizantly aware of her actions
just as the defendant in White was. Mott was obviously aware the law was
being broken or she would not have stated she "feared the authorities"
would take Sheena away upon discovery of Sheena's bruises. In fact,
there is ample evidence in Mott's own statements to show Mott actually
had "bad" or "selfish" motivations in delaying Sheena's treatment, such
as protecting Near or preventing social services from taking Sheena away
from an abusive home.288
It is conceivable that Mott did not intend for her daughter to die or
intend to make the abuse worse, yet the law in mens rea does not require
such a mental computation or analysis. Quite simply, the law will not
excuse Mott's conscious failure to act, no matter how little such a decision
was evaluated or contemplated in her mind, even if Mott was motivated
by unconscious influences that were a product of her genes or of her
environment.289 Mott purposely wanted to hide the bruises, purposely
wanted to protect Near from getting in trouble, and purposely delayed one
284

Id. at 24.
Mott, 187 Ariz. at 540 (Ariz. 1997).
See State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 540; 931 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Ariz. 1997).
28? White, 766 F.2d at 24.
288
See Mott, 187 Ariz. at 538 (Ariz. 1997); State v. Mott, 183 Ariz. 191, 193; 901 P.2d
1221, 1223
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
2
SSee U.S. v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 907 (3rd Cir. 1987).
28 5
Id.;
286
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night "to see if [Sheena] would come out of it."2 ' This undeniably
purposeful action is all the law requires and thus, her proffered BWS
testimony was rightfully excluded.29'
The Distinction, Comparison, and Overruling
of Arizona Precedents
With her Due Process claim effectively and powerfully rebutted by the
court, Mott futilely tried to liken her case to the only existing Arizona
precedents. Primarily, Mott relied on the Arizona court's recent decision
in Gonzales, where expert testimony to negate specific intent was allowed
into evidence.292 Yet, when pressed with Mott's citation and comparison
to Gonzales, the court corrected its erroneous prior decision, overruling
Gonzales in as much as it allowed for an admission contrary to Arizona
law.293 In Gonzales, the court allowed evidence of the defendant's low
intelligence, probable organic brain damage, and mental state because it
was deemed relevant to the defendant's "mere presence" defense. 94 The
Gonzales court ruled the evidence was probative in that it tended to show
Gonzales did not,and could not; have the specific intent to commit rape.295
However, as the Mott court criticized, this "defense" was nothing
more than an attempt to admit expert testimony regarding the defendant's
ability to form the requisite mental state and thus, was evidence of
"diminished capacity" excluded under Schantz. 96 Both Mott and
Gonzales tried to show they lacked the requisite mental state at the time
of the offense by offering testimony that they lacked the ability to form
culpable intent.297 Whether there be a diminished capacity to stop others
from raping as in Gonzales, or a diminished capacity to recognize and care

29Od.

"9 See id.; U.S. v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1066 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
'See State v. Gonzales, 140 Ariz. 349; 681 P.2d 1368 (Ariz. 1980).
"'State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 544; 931 P.2d 1046, 1054 (Ariz. 1997).
'4Gonzales, 140 Ariz. at 351.
2'Id.
W-SMolf,
187 Aiz. at 544 (Ariz. 1997) (citing State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200; 403 P.2d 521

(1965)).

297

fott, 187 Ariz. at 544 (Ariz. 1997); State v. Gonzales, 140 Ariz 349, 351; 631 P.2d

1368, 1370 (Ariz. 1980).
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for an abused child as inMott, both "defects" were justifiably inadmissible
and irrelevant in the court's eyes.2 98
Mott also cited Christensenwhere psychiatric testimony was, in fact,
allowed to assist the defendant in disputing an element of the charge
against him . 299 Although Mott may claim that BWS prevcnted her from
knowingly or intentionally abusing Sheena and causing Sheena's death,
the court clearly illustrated the stinging distinction from Christensen. As
noted above, the Christensen court allowed the psychological testimony
because it was, essentially, "character evidence" and spoke nothing of the
defendant's mental capacity as such.3 °° Christensen did not argue that he
was mentally unable to premeditate or deliberate murder. Rather,
Christensen asserted that because of his tendency to act impulsively and
30 1
reflexively in times of stress he truly did not premeditate the homicide.
Christensen was indeed capable of premeditating, yet his testimony
regarded the acceptable theory that because of his characteristic behavioral
tendencies, he actually did not premeditate.302 Unlike Christensen, Mott
did not assert that at the time of the abuse she did not "intend or
knowingly" stand by as Sheena died, rather, Mott claimed she lacked the
ability to intend or knowingly stand by.303
The distinction is quite simple. Mott was not characteristically
imperceptive as Christensen was characteristically impulsive and
reflexive.3 4 BWS is not a trait, it is a syndrome by its very title and,
although the syndrome may instill many traits in the sufferer such as
"passive acceptance" of abuse or the "traumatic bond" which Dr. Karp
mentioned, these traits are simply effects of the syndrome, and not
character traits. 05 In Arizona, the only "syndrome effects" which may be

298Statev. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536,544; 931 P.2d 1046, 1054 (Ariz. 1997); Gonzales, 140 Ariz.
at 351.

'9Mott, 187 Ariz. at 543-44 (Ariz. 1997); See State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32; 628 P.2d
580 (Ariz. 1981).
3°°See Christensen, 129 Ariz. at 35.
01
3 id.
3021d.

303Id.
3"4See State v. Mort, 187 Ariz. 536, 543-44; 931 P.2d 1046, 1053-54 (Ariz. 1997); State v.
Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 35; 628 P.2d 580, 583 (Ariz. 1981).

30sSee Mott, 187 Ariz. at 543-44 (Ariz. 1997).
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introduced or weighed by a jury in their determination of intent are the
effects or "traits" of insanity.06 Even if Mott's suspicious and
unconvincing claims of fear and "lack of danger perception" were
believed, the Arizona legislature, as well as the court in Schantz, have
made it crystal clear the only mental disease effects allowed will
be those
37
due to insanity, not some other diminished capacity defense. 1
As the court plainly and rightfully concluded, Dr. Karp's testimony
did not meet the standards set forth in the M'Naughten test, the sole test
for criminal responsibility in Arizona, and therefore, the evidence was
justifiably excluded at the trial level. 33 This illuminating and powerful
analysis was elementary and prevented the appellate court from injecting
its own notions of criminal law into the Arizona legal system. By
honoring the standards set forth in their own previous decisions and by
nobly deferring the evidentiary BWS decision to the legislature, the
Arizona Supreme Court rejected Mott's unfounded claims and prevented
future juries from releasing "many dangerous criminals vho obviously
should be under confinement." 30 9 If true, it is indeed unfortunate that Molt
was a battered woman and this article does not suggest that such a claim
should be taken lightly. What this article does argue, however, is that
BWS, as reasoned and offered by Molt, simply does not match up with
judicial precedent and should not be admitted outside of the self-defense
realm. Quite possibly, the best illustration of why Mott's BWS testimony
is inappropriate to negate mnens rea is painted by an examination of Mott's
own statements to police, investigators, and witnesses.
Mott's Damaging Statements
The most damaging evidence to Mott's claim of lack of mens rea does not
come from federal or state case law, it comes, quite simply, from Mott's
very own statements to neighbors, doctors, and the police. Molt was far

"'SeeState v. Ramos, 133 Ariz. 4,6; 64S P.2d 119, 121 (Ariz. 1982); State v. Laffoon, 125

Ariz. 484,486; 610 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Ariz. 1980); State v. Schantz, 98 Aria. 200; 403 P.2d 521
(Ariz. 1965).
"'0See
Mott, 187 Ariz.at 540 (Ariz. 1997); Schantz, 98 Ariz. at 200.
3
30Mott, 187 Ariz. at 541 (Ariz. 1997).

3"See State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536,545; 931 P.2d 1046, 1055 (Ariz. 1997) (citing Schantz,
98 Ariz. at 200).
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from incapable of comprehending the situation at the time of the abuse.
In fact, she was well aware of the serious condition of her child on both
the night of and the day following the abuse.3"' Mott stated that on the
night of the beatings, she was concerned about Sheena and "stayed up all
night" to check on her condition.3 ' It is ludicrous to suggest that an
unconcerned parent, allegedly incapable of realizing or perceiving her
child was in danger, would worry and continuously check on that child's
condition throughout the night.
Further, although Near stated he and Molt should "wait to see if
[Sheena] would come out of it," Mott admitted the reason she did not take
the child to the hospital at that time was because she was worried about
the bruises on Sheena's body, not because she actually thought Sheena
would in fact, "come out of it." ' This is not the motivation of a battered
woman living in fear of her abuser, this is the motivation of a neglecting
mother living in fear of legal prosecution and liability for her own
criminal actions. This pure self-interest on the part of Mott is precisely
why the argument of BWS does not apply, and should not apply, in child
abuse and neglect settings.
Mott recognized that a hospital visit would subject Sheena to an
examination that would undoubtedly reveal the bruises and scars of abuse
and therefore, Mott selfishly delayed the delivery of Sheena, hoping that
such an incriminating and criminally suspecting hospital visit would not
be necessary.1 3 Molt did not want the doctors to question or report the
abuse because Mott feared Sheena would be taken away from her by the
authorities and that Molt herself would be subject to criminal charges.314
The fear of future violence, or imminent violence as BWS illustrates in the
self-defense setting, simply played no part in Mott's ill-motivated actions.
There is simply no connection between Mott's alleged BWS and the
subsequent neglect of Sheena. Mott's very own statements rebut any
assertion to that effect.

33110Mott, 187 Ariz. at 543 (Ariz. 1997).
'State v. Mott, 183 Ariz. 191, 193; 901 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
312
1d.
313
SeeMott,187 Ariz. at 538 (Ariz. 1997).
4
' Mott, 183 Ariz. at 193.
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Even if Mott was "caught up in the moment" and unable to perceive
Sheena's danger the previous night due to Near's presence and alleged
"psychological control," she was certainly well aware, even acutely aware,
of Sheena's injuries the next morning. 15 Evidence of this awareness is
plainly illustrated by Mott's visit to her friend Eric Scott's home the
morning following the abuse when Mott arrived flustered and "crying"
because Sheena "would not wake up." 316 Tears and verbal concern over
Sheena's condition are damaging evidence that Mott was worried and
therefore very aware about Sheena's decreasing chance of survival.
Again, a parent unable to recognize the seriousness of her child's injuries
would hardly be capable of worry, and rarely become emotional to the
point of tears, about the very injuries she claimed "unable to perceive."
Quite simply, Mott was well aware of the seriousness of Sheena's
condition both the night of the beatings and the morning after and thus,
her delay in Sheena's hospitalization, her purposeful act of delaying
Sheena's necessary medical
treatment, was plainly enough to show
317
"knowing or intention."
By recognizing these blatant inconsistencies in Mott's testimony and
defense, it is plain to see why the court was justified in excluding her
testimony. Psychiatric testimony regarding BWS in a situation where the
facts are overwhelmingly against the defendant, can realistically serve one
purpose and one purpose only ... to invoke jury sympathy. Whether under
the guise of diminished capacity, due process, or lack of intent, Mott was
simply trying to transfer her own responsibility and liability to someone
else. By presenting herself as a battered woman and portraying herselfas
the victim rather than Sheena, Mott attempted to admit BWS testimony to
confuse the jury into placing Near and his alleged abuse, rather than
Mott's own culpable neglect, on trial. These selfish motivations simply
cannot excuse or even mitigate a defendant's liability where a child has
been abused and neglected to the point of death.

3'See State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 538; 931 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Ariz. 1997).
316Id.
3171d. at 543; 1053.
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IMPACT
The legal impact of this case is clearly visible when noted that an Indiana
case nearly identical to Mott, rested its decision heavily upon the
erroneous and overruled appellate court decision in Mott.318 Just days
before the Arizona Supreme Court decision in Mott was rendered, the
Indiana Court of Appeals ruled testimony regarding BWS was admissible
319
to show lack of requisite intent for child abuse in State v. Barrett.
Barrett was charged with neglect of a dependent after her four-year-old
son died at the hands of Barrett's severely abusive live-in boyfriend.320
The Barrett court ruled the proffered BWS testimony was relevant and
necessary to determine Barrett's mental state and therefore, necessary to
determine whether she acted knowingly or intentionally in neglecting her
dependent. 21
After citing several other circumstances where BWS testimony in
Indiana has been admitted (i.e. to bolster credibility in the face of
inconsistent testimony or as a mitigating factor during sentencing), the
Barrettcourt relied heavily on the Mott appellate court decision, "the only
other jurisdiction which has considered this issue. ' ' 22 Because both Mott
and Barrett involved a showing of knowing or intention, the respective
courts deemed BWS testimony essential to the defense, and thus an
admission mandated by the Constitution.32 Due to this heavy reliance on
the Mott appellate decision, it is reasonable to assume that future courts
will also look to these preliminary foundation precedents as guiding lights
to rules of admissibility. This places an enormous responsibility on the
courts because, as shown by Barrett,when pressed with their own first
impression scenarios of BWS and child abuse, courts will often refer to
the landmark decision of State v. Mott in Arizona. 24

r'state v. Barrett, 675 N.E.2d 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
319Id.at 1115.
32Id. at 1116.
321Id
3"'Id. at 1117.
3
2See State v. Barrett, 675 N.E.2d 1112, 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Mott, 183
Ariz. 191,
193; 901 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
324See State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536; 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997).
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As evidenced by the lack of case law directly on point, these primary
decisions will provide the foundation upon which BWS admissions in
child abuse neglect situations are decided. Therefore, the decisions must
be carefully scrutinized to prevent abuse just as the Supreme Court of
Arizona did in Mott. Conceivably, and indeed hopefully, the Barrett court
decision will be appealed due to its reliance on the vacated appellate
opinion of Mott, and Barrett's BWS testimony will be excluded in full
accordance with the impeccably reasoned holding in the Supreme Court
of Arizona opinion.32 Yet, with the potential power of these decisions
illustrated, the negative effects must also be explained to show the
rationale behind exclusion. Some may ask, what is the danger in allowing
the admittance of BWS testimony in this area? Just how would such
potential abuse, even if it were to surface, harm the battered woman, the
BWS defense, or society as a whole? The answers are quite simple.
Primarily, as Lenore Walker details and documents in Terrifying
Love, the road to BWS acceptance, even in the self-defense setting, has
been long and difficult.3 26 Many courts and juries remain very skeptical
when reviewing or admitting BWS testimony because they simply do not
consider the syndrome and its effects plausible. Yet, there seems to be
some consensus, psychologically, socially, and legally, that battered
women may indeed be more capable of perceiving when abuse is
imminent and thus, have a greater notion of when "killing in self-defense"
is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury. Yet, if the BWS theory were
3

"Note also that similar litigation is currently underway in Vest Virginia in the case of State

v. Wyatt. State v. Wyatt, 198 W.Va 530; 482 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1996). The issues in Wyatt

were essentially the same as Mott: child abuse and neglect are challenged by BWS testimony on
a lack of mens rea grounds. However, the west Virginia legislature actually adopted the same

MPC section purposely omitted by Arizona in the Mott case. The Wyatt court noted that in
another west Virginia case, State v. Lambert, the court recognized a history of domestic violence

can indeed be a factor that may negate criminal intent. However, the proffered testimony of Wyatt
was excluded because it failed to meet the standards for expert testimony set forth in the West
Virginia case of Wilt v. Brubaker. The Wyatt court did state, however, that if the validity of such

testimony conformed to the standards set forth in Wilt, BWS could be introduced to negate the
necessary intent element of the crime. Hopefully, on remand, the lawyers will raise, and the court
will notice, the strong and persuasive decision in Mott. If future Wlest Virginia decisions are in
accordance with Mott, they will serve to nullify the potentially dangerous dicta the Wyatt court
left behind.
26
See generally WALKER, supra note 193, at 264-328.
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expanded beyond showing a "heightened perception of imminence" and
applied to show an inability to stop child abuse or an inability to perceive
the seriousness of abuse, it is quite likely that judges and juries, will be
more critical and hesitant to accept the BWS theory as a whole.
When BWS testimony is introduced to support an implausible theory,
as it was in Mott, the credibility of the defense as a whole will decrease
substantially. 327 Just as Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform
Act in response to social outcry and criticism of unreasonable "insanity"
based defenses, it is quite possible that if applied to unreasonable cases of
child abuse, the BWS defense will lose its muster and be abolished from
the entire criminal law realm.3 8 Society is not likely to accept the notion
of relieving child abuse or neglect responsibility due to third party abuse.
Therefore, if defendants are consistently relieved from even a fraction of
liability, it is likely our justifiably cynical society will once again call for
tighter restrictions to protect the safety of its children. In the long run, this
skepticism and disbelief of battered women will transfer into a decrease
of utilization and acceptance of BWS even in the self-defense setting
where the syndrome is necessary.
If the defense is abused and blindly expanded to encompass child
abuse, the true battered woman who justifiably kills her abuser to escape
imminent injury will be stripped of her only viable and only applicable
defense. In order to preserve BWS testimony and protect the battered
woman in self-defense situations, courts cannot erroneously apply BWS
to situations such as child abuse where there is likely little public support.
It is much easier and morally settling to find reasonableness in a battered
woman who kills her long-time abuser than it is to find reasonableness
when an innocent child has been abused and left to die. This child abuse
unreasonableness is simply inexcusable. Therefore, the only way to
protect and preserve this already heavily criticized syndrome is to limit its
application to only the most relevant and legally acceptable cases of selfdefense.

327See Mott, 187 Ariz. at 538 (Ariz. 1997).

"Mrhe Insanity Defense Reform Act was passed in the wake of John Hinkley's acquittal of
charges arising from his attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan and Press Secretary James
Brady. Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 17.
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How likely is this predicted abuse of BWS? Very. In his book, The
Abuse Excuse, acclaimed lawyer and legal scholar, Alan Dershowitz,
stated that even in the self-defense setting, "Any time a defense works, it
is quickly abused by some who killed in cold blood." 32'9 Therefore, it is
fair to assume that even if BWS evidence in child abuse situations was
legitimate, abusive and neglecting mothers would be quick to "jump on
the bandwagon" and attempt to excuse their conduct by showing an
abusive history of their own.33 If society was hesitant to accept that a
woman's only option in an abusive relationship is to kill her abuser in
self-defense, "society's heart-strings" will be significantly less
compassionate when faced with the death of a child due to a woman's
negligence. The BWS theory already stands on thin ice support... inject
a murdered child into the situation, and the entire defense is doomed to
fall through.
As Dershowitz continues, although we may be sympathetic to the
battered woman, she still has options beyond killing, or in Mott's case,
options beyond leaving Sheena to die. As "unpalatable as the options may
be," Mott still had options which the law required her to act upon.33'
Quite simply, Mott was merely trying to "deflect responsibility from the
person who committed the criminal act onto someone else who may have
abused him or her or otherwise caused him or her to do."," Court's are
already less than anxious to accept such theories which Dershowitz
claims, "places the victim on trial. ' 33 3 Thus, if the victim becomes a
helpless child who has been neglected and abused to death, there will be
even less acceptance and the possibility of transferring skepticism to the
BWS self-defense realm will become more and more a reality.
This leads into the most important and redeeming consequence of
Arizona's refusal to expand BWS, the protection of the child. In the self-

'9ALANM. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE: AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB STOWJES, AND
EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 14 (1994).
3"°See U.S. v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 1371, 13S2 (56 Cir. 1996) (quoting the mother-abuserwvho

stated she wished the Id vere dead and had to stop beating the child because she was "not going

to go to jail for kill[ing] [that child].").

"'See DERSHOWITZ, supranote 329, at 14.
33Id.
333Id
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defense setting, the victim can be seen as the battered woman or the killed
abuser. However, there is no mistaking the child is the sole victim in child
abuse and neglect situations. Whether Mott was battered or not, the
safety, the welfare, and indeed, the survival of Sheena, was the only real
issue to be considered. Sheena and the thousands of other abused and
neglected children throughout the country are the true beneficiaries of the
decision in Mott. Because of this BWS regulation and restriction,
negligent and abusive parents, regardless of the reasons motivating the
abuse or neglect, will not be sent home, free to neglect and abuse further
until the child ends up like Sheena. If we accept the "third-party control
excuse" as Shelly Kay Mott suggests, it would be difficult, if not
impossible to draw the line on this slippery slope. Would we excuse child
abusers who are severely intoxicated? Would we excuse child abusers
who abuse due to depression from losing their job? Clearly this would
turn legal theory down a dangerous road. Yet, by strictly prosecuting the
parents and those responsible for the care of children, the children
themselves will be better protected and spared from further abuse.
As can be assumed from Mott, had Sheena's abuse been detected
earlier, she would have been taken from MoWs detrimental custody and
placed in a safer, less life threatening and less abusive environment.
Indeed, this is precisely what Mot feared. However, if BWS can negate
intent in child abuse settings, the neglecting parent will be sent back to
further neglect her child, unable to protect the child until it is simply too
late. Only by prosecuting abusive and neglecting parents and not allowing
a reduction in sentencing or charges due to alleged third party domestic
abuse, will the child neglect cease and the innocent abused child be
transferred to a more protective, beneficial, and nurturing environment.
CONCLUSION
It is essential and elementary to remember that the victim in State v. Mott
was Sheena, not Shelly Kay Mott. Child abuse is a continuing and
pressing social problem in America and we cannot allow this societal scar
to be excused or desensitized by transferring liability and diminishing
responsibility due to questionable and inapplicable mental impairments.
Battered Woman Syndrome, while an acceptable and often necessary
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theory of self-defense, simply cannot be justified in the child abuse
setting. The case law, legislative intent, and indeed American social
mandate does not support such a tenuous expansion. In State v. Mott, the
Supreme Court of Arizona, by refusing to allow BWS testimony to negate
specific intent, prevented a dangerous child abuser/neglecter from
escaping justice and thereby protected future abused children from
334
suffering a shameful and appalling fate similar to that of Sheena Mott.
If children are to remain a priority in society, no motivation short of pure
insanity, whether conscious or unconscious, may act to mitigate or excuse
child neglect. The Supreme Court of Arizona believed this assertion and
rightfully upheld the conviction of Shelly Kay Mot. 335 Hopefully, for the
sake of the thousands of abused children throughout the country, future
courts will follow this precedented path.

"3 4See State v. Mott, 1S7 Ariz. 536; 931 P.2d 1046, (Ariz. 1997).
Sld "
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